The United States and Saudi Arabia signed a landmark 30-year nuclear agreement on Wednesday, providing the kingdom with a civilian program and a potential pathway to domestic uranium enrichment. Announced by the Energy Department, the multibillion-dollar deal centers American companies in Saudi infrastructure while shutting out foreign competitors.
The deal establishes a peaceful nuclear cooperation framework, known as a 123 agreement, alongside a bilateral safeguards document, according to the source articles. Signed by U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, the arrangement aims to revitalize the American nuclear industry while keeping foreign rivals out of the region’s energy development, according to the source articles. President Trump last week formally approved the deal, which includes an agreement on nuclear cooperation and a bilateral safeguards document. Wright discussed the deal during his first overseas trip to the region in April 2025 with his Saudi counterpart, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, who also signed the deal.
Uranium Enrichment Provisions and Regional Safeguards
A central provision of the pact gives American firms the right to build a uranium enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia, provided a joint two-year U.S.-Saudi study determines the step is warranted and commercially viable. Under the terms outlined in the source articles, if the United States rejects moving forward with indigenous enrichment after the study concludes, Riyadh would be barred from pursuing enrichment independently or partnering with another foreign nation for a decade. The 123 agreement, the department claims, provides great access for American companies in the Saudi nuclear energy program, benefiting American industry, workers, and supply chains while helping to meet Saudi energy needs.
Administration officials argue that tying the program to American oversight gives Washington a mechanism to prevent military misuse. Robert Einhorn, a former longtime senior State Department official who advised both Republican and Democratic administrations on nonproliferation issues, noted that the agreement could help revitalize the U.S. nuclear industry, strengthen U.S.-Saudi ties, and deny Russia and China a strategically important role in the Saudi nuclear program. As Robert Einhorn stated, The agreement could help revitalize the U.S. nuclear industry, strengthen U.S.-Saudi ties, and deny Russia and China a strategically important role in the Saudi nuclear program.
Congressional Review and Nonproliferation Concerns
The agreement faces a mandatory review period in Congress, where it is expected to generate heated debate. Lawmakers have long expressed apprehension that exporting enrichment capabilities to the Middle East could accelerate nuclear arms proliferation. The source articles mention that congressional opposition centers on fears surrounding monitoring safeguards, though blocking the 30-year pact would require a joint resolution and a two-thirds majority vote if needed to override a potential presidential veto. The deal is expected to be submitted to Congress for review in the coming days.
Long-running diplomatic talks stretching over more than one administration leading up to the signing were shaped by the reality that Riyadh could seek nuclear partnerships elsewhere if Washington did not provide what it wanted. Saudi Arabia has long said that if it does not partner with the US, it could do so with China or Russia, which have different proliferation standards.
Parallel Conflict and Inspection Hurdles in Iran
The Saudi nuclear pact coincides with an intensifying U.S. military conflict with Iran, which Pete Hegseth, the defense secretary, told the Senate on Tuesday had thus far cost $37.5bn. The Trump administration last month asked Congress to authorize approximately $88bn in supplemental funding, the majority of which – up to $67.1bn – will go to pay for the war, while House Republicans have agreed to begin the process of writing a $95bn bill to fund the war with Iran as well as provide new aid to farmers, while making a long-shot attempt to impose new restrictions on voting nationwide. As strikes continue across western and central Iran in the US military’s 12th successive night of strikes—in attacks lasting five hours, the US claims to have struck military targets including maritime capabilities, missile and drone storage facilities, and coastal surveillance—verification of nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency has emerged as a central diplomatic test. Having crushed Iran’s nuclear capabilities during two wars in joint attacks with the Israelis, the latest and most significant chapter of whether there will be peace is whether the regime will allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to its nuclear weapons facilities.
David Albright, a physicist and president of the Institute for Science and International Security, who is widely viewed as one of the world’s leading experts on Iran’s nuclear weapons program, expressed skepticism regarding IAEA access given historical compliance issues. As David Albright told Fox News Digital, the IAEA comes up short
in its efforts to secure information and verification about Iran’s nuclear weapons program because Iran has not cooperated for twenty years.
Albright added that Iran loves to generate plans of action that can be extended
and the process becomes a pointless exercise,
noting that Iran’s skill in the art of procrastination has allowed it to stretch out talks over the decades while working to advance its work on a nuclear weapons device and a missile system to deliver it, which colors my view of the MOU [Memorandum of Understanding]
agreed to between the U.S. and Iran that codifies IAEA inspections of Iran’s atomic weapons program.
“The way Iran treats the IAEA will tell us if the negotiations are meaningful.”
David Albright, Institute for Science and International Security
Conflicting statements and reports from President Trump and Iran’s Foreign Ministry suggest the U.N.’s IAEA will face the same recalcitrant policy from Tehran it has experienced for two decades in blocking its inspectors from conducting robust verification of the clerical regime’s vast nuclear facilities, including underground compounds.
Sources: WSJ.