The Cuban Council of Ministers published Agreement 10216 in the Gaceta Oficial on February 25, 2026, a regulation targeting all e-commerce platforms operating with foreign currency payments. Though adopted on August 27, 2025, the regime waited six months to make it public, a delay that itself reveals the political calculation behind the measure.
Many entrepreneurs view this agreement as a desperate move by the government against small and medium-sized enterprises (pymes), just as the private sector had become the only viable element in Cuba’s struggling economy.
Platforms like SuperMarket23, Cuballama, Cubamax, DimeCuba, Cubatel Market, MallHabana, EnviosCuba, CompreMarket, and over a dozen similar services that allow the Cuban diaspora to send food, medicine, and basic goods to their families on the island are now directly threatened by this regulatory framework.
What Agreement 10216 Seeks to Do
Behind the bureaucratic language, the objective is clear: to capture the foreign currency flowing through e-commerce that currently escapes direct state control. The agreement stipulates that the Central Bank of Cuba will decide who can receive payments from abroad, giving the regime control over who operates and who does not.
It requires all platforms to register with state registries, submit to full tax supervision, and register their systems with the Ministry of Communications. Most significantly, the agreement demands that e-commerce revenue be “routed as a priority to accounts in Cuban banks,” effectively seeking to funnel all diaspora spending through state control.
The agreement likewise directly prohibits the sale of goods to foreign entities for resale to beneficiaries in Cuba, attacking the business model of most platforms operating from outside the island – precisely where Cuban consumers in exile place their trust.
taxes must be paid in foreign currency, not Cuban pesos. The regime does not want a share in the devalued national currency; it wants dollars.
Evidence These Stores Are Not Regime-Controlled
For years, the argument has circulated that these platforms are businesses of the regime or disguised front companies. This agreement dismantles that narrative.
If these stores were state-controlled, this regulation would not exist. It would not be necessary to force them to register with multiple government agencies, open their books to tax authorities, or comply with cybersecurity regulations from the Ministry of the Interior. They would already be integrated into the state apparatus.
The agreement demonstrates that the dictatorship is observing a significant flow of foreign currency circulating through channels it does not control, and it found that intolerable.
Legal Absurdity: Complying with Havana May Violate U.S. Law
Agreement 10216 presents a contradiction that could render it ineffective for platforms operating from the United States – the majority.
Regulations from the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) prohibit any person or company under U.S. Jurisdiction from engaging in financial transactions that benefit the Cuban government, its armed forces, or related entities. GAESA, CIMEX, and FINCIMEX – the military conglomerate that controls much of the Cuban economy – are on the Department of State’s list of restricted entities, reinstated by the Trump administration in January 2025 with 237 entities. The Central Bank of Cuba is, by definition, a government institution.
The current context makes this contradiction even more stark. Since returning to power, the Trump administration has drastically tightened sanctions against Cuba, redesignating the island as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, reissuing the NSPM-5 presidential memorandum expanding restrictions on military and governmental entities, and declaring a national emergency with respect to Cuba via Executive Order 14380 in January 2026. Washington is currently exerting maximum pressure on the Cuban regime.
In this scenario, what Agreement 10216 demands – channeling e-commerce revenue to the Cuban state banking system and submitting to authorization from the Central Bank – could constitute a direct violation of U.S. Sanctions, carrying penalties of up to 10 years in prison and fines of up to $1 million for companies and $250,000 for individuals.
U.S. Policy, under both Democratic and Republican administrations, has consistently held that authorized transactions should benefit the independent Cuban private sector, not the state apparatus. Agreement 10216 aims for the opposite.
The agreement also requires platforms to provide Cuban tax authorities with “information, access, and supervision” mechanisms and to comply with cybersecurity regulations dictated by the Ministry of the Interior – the MININT, the dictatorship’s repressive apparatus. In practice, this means handing over transaction data, personal information of U.S. Customers, and access to internal systems to a state designated as a Sponsor of Terrorism.
Potential Violations of Third-Country Laws
Implementing Agreement 10216 could also conflict with legislation in countries beyond the United States. Several e-commerce platforms serving the Cuban diaspora operate from Europe – particularly Spain – and have users in multiple jurisdictions. Compliance with Havana’s demands could lead to a chain of legal violations for these companies.
In the European Union, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) prohibits the transfer of personal data to third countries that do not guarantee an adequate level of protection. Cuba does not have an adequacy decision from the European Commission – nor could it realistically obtain one, given the criteria requiring respect for the rule of law, human rights, and independent supervisory authorities. Transferring European user data to the Cuban Ministry of the Interior or tax administration would constitute an illegal data transfer under the GDPR, with fines reaching 20 million euros or 4% of the company’s global turnover.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that the agreement demands data from the MININT through its cybersecurity regulations and the regime’s tax administration. Providing “information, access, and supervision” to a dictatorial police force goes beyond regulatory compliance; it directly endangers user security.
The Regime Lost This Business Through Incompetence
For decades, state-run stores (formerly TRD, Cimex, Panamericana) held a monopoly on capturing diaspora remittances. The business was lucrative: families abroad sent dollars, and the government sold imported goods at enormous margins through its state chains.
But the regime was unable to maintain this business. State-run stores in MLC (Freely Convertible Currency) became a fiasco: empty shelves, poor-quality products, inflated prices, and deplorable service. The Cuban state’s chronic inability to manage a basic supply chain led the diaspora to seek alternatives, which they found in e-commerce platforms operated by Cuban entrepreneurs.
Now, the dictatorship resorts to what it knows best: legislating to control, prohibit, and extract value from the work of others. It seeks to forcibly recover what it lost through its own incompetence.
What Comes Next
The agreement will come into effect 60 days after its publication, around April 26, 2026. Those already operating will have an additional 30 days to comply with the fresh requirements once the Central Bank issues supplementary provisions.
The key question is whether platforms operating from abroad will submit to these demands or seek ways to continue operating outside of state control.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Agreement 10216?
Agreement 10216 is a regulation published by the Cuban Council of Ministers that targets e-commerce platforms operating with foreign currency payments, requiring them to register with the state and route revenue through Cuban banks.
Which platforms are affected by this agreement?
Platforms like SuperMarket23, Cuballama, Cubamax, DimeCuba, Cubatel Market, MallHabana, EnviosCuba, and CompreMarket, along with over a dozen similar services, are directly threatened by this regulatory framework.
Could this agreement violate U.S. Law?
Yes, complying with the agreement’s demands – channeling revenue to the Cuban state banking system and submitting to the Central Bank’s authorization – could constitute a violation of U.S. Sanctions, potentially leading to significant penalties.
Will the Cuban government be able to enforce this agreement, given the potential legal challenges and the reliance on foreign platforms?
