Israeli security officials focused on targeting Hamas military chief Mohammed Deif on the morning of October 7, 2023, even as early signs of a potential incursion began to emerge. Investigations released by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) show that senior leadership directed significant assets toward tracking Deif’s movements during the hours leading up to the Hamas invasion.
Focus on Mohammed Deif During Morning Hours
While IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi and Southern Command Chief Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkleman initially assessed whether Hamas was planning a limited attack, Air Force Chief Maj. Gen. Tomer Bar dedicated hours to potential assassination efforts. The military had tracked Deif as he left his home to enter the Hamas underground network, heading toward a command center.
Finkleman also allocated considerable resources to monitor Deif’s location and the actions of other top Hamas figures. At the time, intelligence officials did not consider a large-scale surprise attack a realistic scenario. Instead, they operated under the assumption that the worst-case development would be a small breach involving only one or two Israeli villages.
Did You Know? Prior to the October 7 invasion, Israeli security officials largely considered Mohammed Deif to be a more significant and dangerous threat than Hamas’s Gaza Chief Yahya Sinwar. It was Deif who publicly announced the invasion at 7:58 a.m. that morning, calling for regional forces to join the effort against Israel.
Signs of Escalation Misinterpreted
Internal probes reveal that the military held incomplete intelligence regarding Hamas’s true intentions. Although an IDF drone recorded Gazan terrorists removing protective coverings from rockets aimed at Israel, this development did not alert top officers to the scale of the impending operation. The military had attempted to kill Deif multiple times over the previous decade, wounding him twice, but the failure to finalize those efforts remained a central priority for the Air Force.
Expert Insight: The prioritization of a high-value target like Deif over broader intelligence analysis illustrates the challenges of strategic focus.
Shift in Strategic Targets
Following the October 7 invasion, the perception of Hamas leadership changed. While Deif managed the military planning, Yahya Sinwar was eventually identified as the ideological architect of the attack and became Israel’s primary target. Both men were eventually killed—Deif in July 2024 and Sinwar in October 2024—after military operations in northern Gaza, Khan Yunis, and Rafah.
Tracking Deif’s Movements Shapes Strike Priorities
Why did the IDF focus on Mohammed Deif on October 7?
Air Force and Southern Command leadership were tracking Deif as he moved into the Hamas underground network, continuing a decade-long effort to eliminate him. Officials at the time did not believe a large-scale invasion was likely, leading them to prioritize his assassination over other potential threats.
What intelligence signs were missed before the invasion?
An IDF drone observed terrorists removing coverings from rockets aimed at Israel, which indicated a state of combat readiness. However, top officers lacked a full picture of the situation and believed the maximum threat was a small-scale breach of one or two villages.
How did the perception of Hamas leaders change after the attack?
Before the invasion, Deif was viewed as the most dangerous figure in Hamas. Following the attack, Sinwar was recognized as the ideological architect of the invasion, shifting the focus of Israeli military objectives until both men were killed in 2024.
To what extent will future intelligence reviews change how the military balances the pursuit of high-value targets against the monitoring of broad-scale threats?
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