The Evolution of Russian Disinformation Targeting the Baltic States

Russian state-aligned propaganda is increasingly framing the Baltic states as active participants in the war in Ukraine to justify potential retaliatory strikes. According to an investigation by Re:Baltica, a series of unrelated events—including stray Ukrainian drones and regional power outages—has been synthesized by Kremlin-linked networks into a single narrative of Baltic complicity in NATO-backed aggression.

How Does the Kremlin Construct These Narratives?

The construction of these narratives relies on injecting official authority into pre-existing, fringe digital conversations. On May 19, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) issued a formal statement alleging that Ukrainian military personnel were using Latvian territory to prepare strikes against Russian “decision-making centres.”

This statement served as an accelerant. Before the SVR’s intervention, claims about “open skies” for Ukrainian drones had circulated primarily on Telegram channels and TikTok. Once the SVR provided this “official” weight, major state-affiliated outlets like TASS and Readovka amplified the message, effectively turning speculation into a state-level warning. As Re:Baltica reports, the narrative was subsequently elevated to the United Nations Security Council by Russia’s ambassador, Vasily Nebenzya, who explicitly warned that NATO membership would not protect Latvia from “retaliatory strikes.”

Why Is the Language Shifting Toward Martial Rhetoric?

Pro-Kremlin commentators are increasingly utilizing the language of casus belli—a cause for war—to frame Baltic support for Ukraine as a direct military threat to Russia. Platforms like Solovyov Live have argued that if a drone is launched from Baltic territory, it is effectively a “NATO drone,” regardless of its origin.

This framing serves two strategic purposes:

• Reframing Vulnerability: It shifts the focus away from Russia’s own defensive weaknesses and toward an external “threat” located in the Baltics.
• Eroding Trust: By claiming that Latvian officials are “covering up” these operations, the propaganda targets the internal stability of Baltic democratic institutions.

How Do Localized Disinformation Networks Operate?

The dissemination of these messages is not random; it is highly structured. Re:Baltica identified a clear amplification chain involving former RT contributors and local activists who have relocated to Russia. Channels such as Shadows of the Baltics, The Baltic Bridge, and Baltnews act as secondary distribution nodes, ensuring that content reaches Russian-speaking audiences within the Baltic states.

A notable tactic is the personalization of attacks. For instance, when Maria Zakharova, a spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, attacked Latvia’s U.N. ambassador, Sanita Pavļuta-Deslandes, the move was not an isolated incident. It was part of a coordinated social media push, with nearly half of the identified posts appearing as reposts from a hub managed by Alexey Stefanov, a former Riga-based journalist now working for RT.

What Is the Historical Context of These Claims?

Mārtiņš Hiršs, a researcher of disinformation, notes that this strategy is not a new development. Similar claims regarding the training of “provocateurs” in the Baltics were documented as early as 2014. The current drone incidents are being repurposed to fit this older, established framework of the “Russophobic” Baltic state.

According to Hiršs, the paradox of these claims is that they actually highlight a shift in the reality of the conflict: Ukraine’s military capabilities are expanding, allowing for longer-range operations. By labeling these as “Baltic-based” attacks, the Kremlin attempts to mask its own defensive failures behind a narrative of NATO escalation.

Frequently Asked Questions

Are these drone incidents part of a coordinated NATO plan?

No. Baltic states have dismissed these allegations as falsehoods and have filed formal diplomatic protests in response to the claims.

Why does Russia target Baltic diplomats specifically?

Targeting individuals like Sanita Pavļuta-Deslandes allows propaganda networks to create a “face” for their broader narrative, portraying the country as a hostile and immoral actor rather than a sovereign state.

How can readers identify this type of propaganda?

Look for narratives that frame defensive or accidental events as “proof” of hidden aggression, and note if the information originates from channels with known links to state-affiliated media like RT or TASS.

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