The Dissolution of Wagner and the Future of Russian Mercenary Groups: A Shifting Landscape

The Wagner Group, once a prominent force in global conflicts, is undergoing a significant transformation following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s ill-fated rebellion and subsequent death. This article explores the current state of Wagner, its evolving role in Africa, and the potential future of Russian mercenary activities, focusing on key trends and emerging challenges.

The Fall of Wagner: From Rebellion to Reorganization

Prigozhin’s march on Moscow in June 2023, though short-lived, marked a turning point for the Wagner Group. This act of defiance against President Putin accelerated the Kremlin’s plans to dismantle the mercenary organization. The move stemmed from Prigozhin’s public criticism of the military leadership and his growing popularity, which Putin saw as a direct challenge to his authority.

Ten days before the mutiny, Putin proposed that all paramilitary fighters in Ukraine sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense. This was a clear attempt to bring Wagner and other private military companies (PMCs) under direct state control.

As Vanda Felbab-Brown, an expert at the Brookings Institution, notes, Prigozhin overestimated his independence and influence within the power structure. His challenge to Putin ultimately sealed his fate.

Following Prigozhin’s death in a plane crash in August 2023, Russia initiated the expulsion of Wagner from eastern Ukraine, offering its fighters integration into the Russian Armed Forces. While some accepted, others joined the Russian Guard or the Chechen Akhmat Battalion. This reintegration aimed to prevent the emergence of another figure capable of mobilizing discontent within the ranks.

Wagner’s utility to the Russian state declined as the regular army improved its performance. As Felbab-Brown succinctly puts it, “Wagner served the state while it was useful, and when it became dangerous, the Russian government liquidated it.” This applies to both Ukraine and, in different ways, to Africa.

Wagner’s African Footprint: Resistance to Dissolution

With its presence diminished in Ukraine, Wagner’s focus shifted to Africa, where it had established a strong foothold. However, the Kremlin sought to dissolve Wagner’s operations here as well, aiming to eliminate the problem at its source.

Wagner had operated in Crimea and Luhansk in 2014 and in Syria in 2015, but it was in Africa that the group gained true autonomy and expanded its business interests. They filled the security vacuum left by departing French troops, offering their services to local governments. This led to concerns from figures like Emmanuel Macron, who expressed frustration over the “epidemic of coups” in Francophone Africa and the “strange alliance” between pan-Africanists and neo-imperialists.

Countries like Mali, Libya, Burkina Faso, Niger, and the Central African Republic became strongholds for Wagner. In the Central African Republic, the arrival of 1,500 Russian mercenaries in 2020 led to a successful counteroffensive against rebel groups. This demonstrated the effectiveness of the paramilitary strategy in Africa, prompting other governments, like Mali, to enlist Wagner’s services.

In response to Wagner’s growing influence, Russia began establishing the Africa Corps, a paramilitary structure subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Defense and military intelligence (GRU). The name “Africa Corps” is a deliberate echo of the German unit that fought in North Africa during World War II.

However, the transition has not been seamless. As Dimitri Zufferey, author of ‘Los señores de la guerra: Qué es Wagner y cómo actúa el aparato paramilitar ruso,’ explains, “The withdrawal of Wagner is happening gradually and often through mergers or absorptions rather than a dismantling.”

In Libya, where Wagner fought alongside General Khalifa Haftar in 2019, the integration of its fighters into the Africa Corps has been relatively straightforward.

The situation in Mali has been more complex. Wagner continued to fight against jihadist groups and Tuareg separatists until recently. While a Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel declared “mission accomplished,” experts believe the decision to leave Mali was driven by the Kremlin’s desire to consolidate control under the Africa Corps.

Following Wagner’s departure from Mali, an investigation uncovered a network of illegal prisons controlled by the group, where hundreds of civilians were detained. These facilities were part of a repressive system operating outside the law. According to the human rights organization Kal Akal, 668 citizens were detained or abducted with the involvement of Russian mercenaries in less than two years.

Furthermore, a confidential report on potential crimes committed by Wagner in Africa between 2021 and 2024 has been presented to the International Criminal Court, detailing torture, mutilation, extrajudicial executions, and even instances of cannibalism.

The Central African Republic remains Wagner’s last significant stronghold, where its influence is expected to persist. Sources within the mercenary group’s leadership have stated their intent to maintain their autonomy.

Emergence of “Mini-Prigozhins”

Even with the Africa Corps gaining prominence, the specter of decentralized power looms. “The remnants of Wagner that are still independent of the Afrika Korps have an increasingly limited influence,” says Felbab-Brown. Zufferey emphasizes the “complete coordination” between Wagnerites, the GRU, and the foreign intelligence service (SVR).

A key figure in overseeing these paramilitary activities is Andrei Averyanov, a former commander of the secret military unit 29155, known for sabotage, assassination, and hybrid warfare in Europe, including the poisoning of Sergei Skripal in the UK in 2018.

Despite Wagner’s practical disappearance, Russia maintains its strategic interest in Africa, with the Kremlin operating more openly, according to Felbab-Brown. Zufferey describes a triple strategy of influence: security, economic, and informational. “Russian influence is primarily based on local elites who depend on Russian protection and opaque economic contracts,” he argues.

Challenges for the Africa Corps

The Africa Corps faces challenges in replicating Wagner’s operational flexibility and brutality. According to Zufferey, without this flexible intervention force, Moscow risks losing its effectiveness on the ground, especially in the fight against jihadist groups or in the control of resources.

Financing this influence campaign also presents a challenge. Lechner and Eledinov note that Prigozhin understood the importance of self-sufficiency. While the Africa Corps aims to avoid creating another Prigozhin, Russia’s political economy may foster the emergence of new “mini-Prigozhins” – a new generation of patriotic oligarchs and entrepreneurs willing to fill budgetary gaps in regions like the Sahel.

Lessons Learned from Wagner

Even if Wagner is fully integrated into Russian state security structures, its legacy will be difficult to erase. Zufferey highlights that Wagner has “highlighted the limitations of the conventional Russian army and the internal tensions of the government.”

Jack Margolin, author of *The Wagner Group: Inside Russia’s Mercenary Army*, notes that Prigozhin ultimately achieved what he demanded before his rebellion: for Russian forces to become more like Wagner in order to be more effective.

Some of Wagner’s brutal tactics, such as “meat assaults,” persist in certain units of the Russian army. These tactics, used during the capture of Bakhmut, involve sending soldiers against enemy lines regardless of casualties.

The end of the war in Ukraine poses another uncertainty. A peace agreement could tempt Putin to send experienced veterans to Africa to bolster the Africa Corps. However, this carries the risk of creating a new Prigozhin.