The Fracturing World Order: Why ‘Minilateralism’ is the New Global Strategy
The post-World War II order, built on multilateral institutions and transatlantic cooperation, is showing significant strain. Weak economic growth in the West, coupled with disrupted supply chains and escalating geopolitical tensions – particularly involving nuclear powers – are creating a volatile international landscape. Simultaneously, the rise of Asian economic powerhouses is reshaping trade dynamics, while increasingly unilateral actions from the United States are testing long-held alliances. This isn’t a new phenomenon; echoes of the early 1970s, marked by the oil shock, the Vietnam War, and Japan’s economic ascent, are becoming increasingly apparent.
A Return to the ‘70s – And Lessons Learned
The 1970s saw a similar erosion of cooperative frameworks. In response, influential figures like David Rockefeller and Zbigniew Brzezinski recognized the need for new forms of collaboration in an increasingly interdependent world. This led to the creation of the Trilateral Commission in 1973, a pioneering example of “minilateralism” – informal dialogue between policymakers, business leaders, and experts from the US, Europe, and Japan. This wasn’t about replacing existing institutions, but supplementing them with more agile, focused cooperation.
Europe played a pivotal role. Max Kohnstamm, a key architect of the European Single Market, chaired the Commission’s European section. Jacques Delors famously used a Trilateral Commission conference in 1989 to unveil his vision for a unified European Single Market, demonstrating how informal discussions could drive significant systemic reform. This highlights the power of focused, collaborative problem-solving outside the constraints of formal bureaucracy.
The Tech Triad: A Half-Century of Interdependence
For over five decades, cooperation between the US, Europe, and East Asia has been the engine of technological progress. The semiconductor industry, arguably the most crucial technology of our time, is a prime example. Its development relied on highly internationalized supply chains, the free flow of talent, and massive cross-border investment. Hundreds of billions of dollars were invested by companies across these regions, enabling Moore’s Law – the observation that the number of transistors on a microchip doubles approximately every two years – to become a reality.
This success stemmed from global specialization. The separation of chip design (often in the US) and manufacturing (predominantly in East Asia) created an efficient international division of labor. A single chip can traverse multiple countries and continents during its production, showcasing the depth of this interdependence. This efficiency has made semiconductors ubiquitous, powering everything from household appliances to smartphones.
Did you know? Immigrants made up roughly one-third of Silicon Valley’s scientists and engineers by 1990, with significant contributions from China, Taiwan, India, and Hong Kong. The Taiwanese diaspora, in particular, played a crucial role in establishing world-class semiconductor manufacturing in Taiwan.
The Cracks Begin to Show: A New Tech Cold War
However, this model is now under considerable strain. Even before the potential return of Donald Trump to office, US engagement with Europe in the Indo-Pacific region had begun to wane. While the US has sought closer coordination with allies to counter China’s influence, this has largely focused on Japan and Australia, with less emphasis on Europe. The current trend towards bilateral agreements, domestic reindustrialization, and containment of China further exacerbates these tensions.
We are entering a “Tech Cold War,” where competition with China extends beyond economics to encompass strategic control over key technologies. Unlike the original Cold War, innovation is now largely driven by private companies operating within globally interconnected systems. This creates new vulnerabilities, particularly in supply chains that can be – and increasingly are – weaponized. Recent export controls on advanced semiconductor technology to China are a clear illustration of this trend.
Minilateralism: A Pragmatic Path Forward
As traditional multilateral structures weaken, countries outside the US-China duopoly face growing pressure. European and East Asian democracies are deeply intertwined with the US economy while simultaneously relying on Chinese markets. Decoupling is not a realistic option; managing dependence and rebalancing cooperation under conditions of strategic rivalry is the key challenge.
Minilateral tech diplomacy offers a viable solution. As Zbigniew Brzezinski warned, trust and credibility are essential for any successful alliance. Traditional strategies of bandwagoning or balancing are ill-suited to the current environment. “Soft balancing” – flexible, issue-driven cooperation – is becoming increasingly attractive, particularly given uncertainties surrounding US commitments.
Pro Tip: Focus on building resilience through diversification and strategic partnerships, rather than pursuing complete technological autonomy. Complete self-reliance is often unrealistic and can stifle innovation.
Europe’s Role: Adapting Existing Instruments
Minilateral arrangements typically involve a small number of partners (three to seven), focus on concrete objectives, and encourage informal exchanges between governments, businesses, and researchers. They are practical, adaptable, and voluntary, avoiding the complexities of large-scale institutionalization.
Europe has several existing instruments that can be adapted to this approach. Expanding the EU Trade and Technology Councils (currently with the US and India) is a logical first step. EU Digital Partnerships with South Korea, Japan, Singapore, and Canada can be strategically linked to Horizon Europe – the world’s largest transnational research and development program. The Eureka network can facilitate joint innovation initiatives in strategic technologies. Initiatives like the Semiconductor Talent Incubation Program between Germany and Taiwan, and the Danish International Quantum Hub, offer scalable models for collaboration.
Building Bridges, Not Walls
These formats demonstrate how Europe can work pragmatically with Asian technology democracies to secure supply chains, foster innovation, and manage interdependence. Rather than seeking technological isolation, Europe should prioritize resilience through diversification and partnership. Managed interdependence, not self-reliance, will define the next phase of globalization.
Strategically, Europe risks marginalization as the US pivots towards Asia and bilateralism. To counter this, European states must deepen minilateral partnerships with Asian democracies, building scale, talent pools, and credibility that can eventually revitalize trilateral cooperation with the United States.
Priorities for Action
Key priorities include: deepening digital and technology partnerships; focusing joint research and development on semiconductors and quantum technologies; pooling public and private investment; facilitating talent mobility; maintaining informal dialogue; and strengthening supply-chain resilience through diversification. The recent CHIPS Act in the US, while primarily focused on domestic production, also includes provisions for international cooperation, signaling a potential pathway for renewed collaboration.
The history of trilateral cooperation demonstrates that transcontinental collaboration is both possible and necessary. In an era of weaponizable supply chains and critical technologies, Europe cannot afford to stand on the sidelines. By investing in tech minilaterals with Asian partners, Europe can rebuild balance, revive trilateral cooperation, and help shape a more stable and resilient global technological order.
FAQ
Q: What is ‘minilateralism’?
A: Minilateralism refers to cooperation between a small number of countries (typically 3-7) on specific issues, often through informal channels.
Q: Why is the semiconductor industry so important?
A: Semiconductors are the foundation of modern technology, powering everything from smartphones to critical infrastructure. Control over semiconductor technology is therefore strategically vital.
Q: Is decoupling from China inevitable?
A: Complete decoupling is unlikely and would be economically damaging. The focus should be on managing dependence and diversifying supply chains.
Q: What role can Europe play in this new landscape?
A: Europe can leverage its existing partnerships and instruments to build minilateral collaborations with Asian democracies, fostering innovation and resilience.
The next chapter of globalization will be written not by those who build walls, but by those who build bridges between the United States, Europe, and Asia.
