The United States may be on the brink of another “middle-sized war,” specifically with Iran, according to a recent analysis. These conflicts, as defined by military historian James Stokesbury in 1988, fall between the scale of “little wars” fought by professionals and the all-encompassing mobilization of “really big wars.” They are characterized by significant destruction and bloodshed without fully engaging the entire home front.
Understanding Middle-Sized Wars
Unlike “limited wars,” which are intentionally constrained in scope, middle-sized wars grow from what were initially intended to be smaller conflicts. The analysis notes that U.S. Leaders currently engaged in these middle-sized wars lack the clear understanding of objectives seen in limited wars. Examples of past conflicts fitting this description include the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Korea, and Vietnam, though these did not reach the scale of the two World Wars.
The Risks for the U.S.
Middle-sized wars pose a unique threat to the United States, damaging presidential administrations and eroding public trust in the government’s foreign policy capabilities. Historically, the American public has expressed a desire to avoid such conflicts, declaring an end to them after wars in Vietnam and Iraq. The current situation with Iran, where continued bombing by the U.S. And Israel could lead to anarchy and destabilization of the Persian Gulf, presents a potential escalation point.
The analysis frames the U.S. As a “de facto empire,” suggesting that involvement in these types of conflicts is inherent to that status. Still, repeated engagement in middle-sized wars, despite public opposition, could ultimately weaken the country and contribute to its decline.
The Problem of Miscalculation
Decision-making in a “crisis-prone world” is fraught with uncertainty, as articulated by Carl von Clausewitz. Leaders often lack complete information and must make choices with limited knowledge of the situation on the ground. The Iraq War is cited as an example of acting “too precipitously.” Even as Iran is closer to achieving nuclear capabilities in 2026 than Iraq was in 2003, it remains unclear whether this necessitates military action.
Tensions with China and North Korea are also highlighted as potential flashpoints. A conflict in the western Pacific, due to its economic importance, could be far more damaging than previous middle-sized wars. Conflict with North Korea could lead to domestic chaos and calls for international intervention.
Escalation and the Path Forward
Despite a promise to end “forever wars,” the Trump administration has found itself potentially embroiled in new conflicts through “loose rhetoric, poor planning, and a lack of policy discipline.” Incremental escalation, such as sending special forces into Iran in the event of a civil war, could quickly spiral out of control, mirroring the years-long escalation of the war in Vietnam. Conflicts with drug cartels in Mexico, Venezuela, and Nigeria also present similar risks.
The analysis emphasizes the importance of understanding local conditions, referencing historian Barbara Tuchman’s argument that the U.S. Would have been better served in Vietnam by focusing on local factors rather than geopolitics. The failure to heed warnings from area experts prior to the Iraq War is also cited as a cautionary tale.
The danger of “false honor”—reacting violently to perceived insults—is identified as a potential catalyst for escalation. The events in Fallujah in 2004, where a desire to “teach a lesson” led to further casualties, are used as an example. Land engagements are particularly dangerous, and the U.S. Should be wary of becoming involved in such conflicts, especially in the Eastern Hemisphere.
Former Secretary of State Colin Powell’s “Powell Doctrine”—emphasizing overwhelming force, an exit strategy, a vital national interest, a clear objective, and broad support—is presented as a framework for avoiding these pitfalls. The analysis suggests that avoiding middle-sized wars requires careful consideration of smaller conflicts and a commitment to restraint.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is a “middle-sized war”?
A middle-sized war is a conflict that causes significant destruction and bloodshed but does not fully mobilize a nation’s resources, unlike a “big war.” It differs from a “limited war” in that it grows out of a smaller conflict rather than being intentionally constrained.
What makes middle-sized wars particularly problematic for the United States?
Middle-sized wars tend to damage presidential administrations and erode public trust in the government’s ability to conduct foreign policy. The public often desires to avoid these conflicts, yet the U.S. Repeatedly finds itself involved in them.
What factors contribute to the escalation of small conflicts into middle-sized wars?
Factors include loose rhetoric, poor planning, a lack of policy discipline, a focus on geopolitics over local conditions, and the impulse to react violently to perceived insults or injured pride.
Given the potential for escalation and the historical consequences of middle-sized wars, how can policymakers best balance national interests with the require for restraint in a complex and volatile world?
