As foreign policy experts warn against a U.S. Attack on Iran, the White House reportedly believes President Donald Trump can manage any fallout. This confidence stems from a pattern where Trump disregards advice from the foreign policy establishment and proceeds with actions that, in the past, have not resulted in apparent repercussions. In 2018, the move of the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem prompted predictions of widespread protests that did not materialize. Similarly, joining Israel’s strikes on Iran’s nuclear program last June and ousting Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in January did not lead to the widespread chaos predicted by analysts.
However, the current situation differs. Having served as President Joe Biden’s Iran director and on Trump’s negotiating team in 2025, one assessment is that Trump does not grasp that Iran’s current weakness will not compel it to compromise. Instead, Iran believes the United States and Israel intend to repeatedly strike its ballistic missile program—which it views as essential for its self-defense—and must respond aggressively to prevent being overwhelmed.
Trump’s Motivations and the Risk of Escalation
Trump’s desire to be seen as a historic peacemaker has created a binary choice: force Iran into a new deal or use substantial force. The ambiguity of his motives—demonstrating military prowess, strengthening his negotiating position, fulfilling a vow to protect Iranian protesters, and differentiating himself from President Barack Obama—increases the danger. This contrasts with his previous, more focused operations and could leave him unprepared if a strike does not yield a swift capitulation.
Strategically, attacking Iran is not essential to U.S. Interests, as Tehran poses no immediate threat to the United States. However, Trump has demanded either a comprehensive nuclear deal—including the cessation of all enrichment and its missile program—or military action. This demand for a spectacle aligns with Trump’s playbook, but Iran’s leaders are increasingly unwilling to offer a symbolic victory.
Iranian negotiators prefer specifics and incremental concessions, a contrast to Trump’s approach. At recent negotiations in Geneva, Iran sent a full delegation of experts to discuss technical details, while Trump sent only his special envoy, Steve Witkoff, and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner. Washington is demanding sweeping concessions without offering concrete returns.
Iran will not concede to major demands simply because of a bombing campaign. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, it is believed, would rather die a martyr than negotiate the end of the Islamic Republic. Iran’s negotiating position is now less flexible, having rejected a proposal for a regional summit that could have provided Trump with political cover.
A Dangerous Calculus
Iran recognizes it cannot win an outright war with the United States or Israel. In theory, a strike would prompt Tehran to seek quick de-escalation, as it did in the past. However, Israel and the United States now perceive Iran as weakened, with its proxies neutralized and its nuclear and air defense programs in ruins. Israel has also secured permission to strike Iran’s ballistic missile program. This has led Iran to believe it needs to respond forcefully to avoid perpetual assault.
Khamenei has threatened to sink a U.S. Aircraft carrier and close the Strait of Hormuz, but these actions are unlikely given the U.S. Military buildup in the region. However, inflicting U.S. Casualties is a more plausible option, recalling the 1983 bombing of a Marine barracks in Lebanon. The United States has approximately 40,000 troops in the region.
Iran could also intensify missile strikes on Israeli civilian targets or target global oil flows, potentially disrupting the energy market. It may encourage attacks on ships in the Red Sea or seize adversary ships in the Strait of Hormuz. Targeting the Gulf Arab states’ energy infrastructure is also a possibility, as demonstrated by the 2019 attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil processing facility.
Despite its weakness, Iran retains the ability to inflict pain on the United States. Trump may need a decisive and low-cost end to this situation, but forces both within and outside his administration may push him forward regardless of the cost.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is driving the White House’s confidence in managing a potential strike on Iran?
The White House’s confidence stems from a pattern where President Trump has disregarded warnings from the foreign policy establishment and proceeded with actions that have not resulted in apparent repercussions, such as the move of the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.
What is different about the current situation with Iran compared to previous instances?
Iran now believes that the United States and Israel intend to repeatedly strike its ballistic missile program, which it views as essential for its self-defense, and must respond aggressively to prevent being overwhelmed. This differs from previous situations where Iran chose to de-escalate.
What are some potential ways Iran could retaliate if attacked?
Iran could inflict U.S. Casualties, intensify missile strikes on Israeli civilian targets, target global oil flows, seize adversary ships, or attack the Gulf Arab states’ energy infrastructure.
Given these complex and potentially dangerous circumstances, what role will diplomacy play in preventing further escalation in the region?
