Long-Awaited Memo Reveals Early City Concerns Over 9/11 Toxic Exposure
A memo from October 2001, penned by city attorneys and sent to Deputy Mayor Robert Harding, reveals that New York City officials were concerned about potential lawsuits from as many as 35,000 people exposed to toxins at Ground Zero following the September 11th attacks. The document, known as the “Harding memo,” estimates that approximately 10,000 claims could be filed.
The memo details potential legal challenges related to health advisories issued after the attacks, which could have led individuals to return to the area too soon – or stay away too long – resulting in both physical and economic harm. Concerns also extended to potential lawsuits from rescue workers alleging faulty or nonexistent protective equipment, such as respirators.
The Harding memo has been a key focus for advocates seeking to understand what city officials knew about the dangers present in lower Manhattan in the months following 9/11. Despite these concerns, court documents show the city continued to publicly state that the air quality was “safe and acceptable” between September 12, 2001, and February 2002.
Dust and toxins are now believed to have remained in the area for more than five months after the attacks. While it took a decade for the World Trade Center Health Program to be established in 2011, providing healthcare and studying related illnesses, first responders and survivors began experiencing respiratory illnesses and cancers in the years following the tragedy.
The memo also outlines the city’s consideration of seeking financial relief from the federal government to cover potential liability claims, including those related to “toxic tort cases” that could emerge in the coming decades. City officials expressed concern that juries might be biased in favor of plaintiffs, even with a strong legal defense.
Attorneys Matt McCauley and Andrew Carboy ultimately obtained a copy of the Harding memo not from the city, but from the Dolph Briscoe Center for American History at the University of Texas at Austin, within the papers of the late Village Voice journalist Wayne Barrett, who cited the memo in his 2007 book, “Grand Illusion.”
Advocates believe additional documents remain undisclosed. City Councilwoman Gale Brewer (D-Manhattan) secured legislation last year initiating a Department of Investigation probe into the city’s knowledge of the toxins. The DOI review is ongoing and could take two years, with an estimated cost of $3 million.
Mayor Mamdani is now being urged to release any remaining documents and fully support the DOI’s investigation. While over 100,000 first responders and survivors have signed waivers preventing them from suing over their illnesses, advocates maintain transparency is crucial.
Did You Know? The Harding memo, dated October 2001, projected approximately 35,000 potential plaintiffs and an estimated 10,000 filed claims resulting from the events of September 11th.
Expert Insight: The delayed release of the Harding memo underscores the complexities of accountability following a large-scale disaster. The city’s initial focus on mitigating legal liability, as evidenced in the memo, raises questions about the prioritization of public health versus financial risk in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.
The city’s Corporation Counsel office stated that nominee Steve Banks will review existing records and determine what can be released upon confirmation.
Frequently Asked Questions
What did the Harding memo reveal?
The Harding memo revealed that city officials, just one month after 9/11, were concerned about potential lawsuits from up to 35,000 people who may have been exposed to toxins at Ground Zero.
Where was the Harding memo found?
The memo was found in the personal papers of journalist Wayne Barrett at the Dolph Briscoe Center for American History at the University of Texas at Austin, not directly from the city.
Will the release of this memo lead to new lawsuits?
It is not likely, as more than 100,000 first responders and survivors have already signed waivers agreeing not to sue in exchange for assistance from the WTC Health Program and the 9/11 Victim Compensation fund.
What does this renewed scrutiny of the city’s response to 9/11 mean for future disaster preparedness?
