A civil nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia is now with Congress for review. The proposed 123 agreement—named for the relevant section of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act—surfaces after a decade of halting negotiations that navigated complex regional dynamics and long-standing U.S. nonproliferation goals.
Congressional Review of the Saudi 123 Agreement
The pending review period gives lawmakers a mandatory window to evaluate whether the pact advances U.S. strategic interests or compromises them. According to policy documents, the rollout of the agreement has faced intense debate over departures from the U.S. nonproliferation “gold standard.” Critics point out that the text does not require Riyadh to forgo fuel cycle activities like enrichment and reprocessing, nor does it mandate the adoption of the Additional Protocol, which serves as the highest standard of International Energy Agency safeguards.
Did you know? Of the twenty-six 123 agreements currently maintained by the United States, only two—those with the United Arab Emirates and Taiwan—meet the strict criteria of the traditional nonproliferation gold standard, according to government data.
Controversy Surrounding Uranium Enrichment Provisions
Enrichment remains the most contentious element of the bilateral deal, given that such capabilities can theoretically support a nuclear weapons program. According to the public text, the agreement does not obligate the United States to supply sensitive technologies or transfer restricted data to the kingdom. However, the document explicitly establishes a potential future pathway to cooperation on uranium enrichment, detailing hypothetical parameters that include a potential joint study.
U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright addressed the near-term utility of domestic enrichment in Saudi Arabia during a recent press conference. “Certainly, there’s no reason in the near term to bring enrichment to Saudi Arabia. They don’t even have a nuclear reactor yet,” Wright stated. Under the agreement’s terms, any decision to proceed would require a two-year Joint Enrichment and Conversion Study.
Bespoke Safeguards and International Monitoring
Instead of insisting on the Additional Protocol, the administration opted for a bespoke bilateral safeguards agreement (BSA) with Saudi Arabia. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi described the arrangement as adding layers of very stringent verification. The unclassified text indicates that the BSA will feature provisions similar to aspects of the Additional Protocol, though policy experts note that important questions remain regarding facility coverage and independent IAEA access.
More than 140 states currently implement the Additional Protocol, which was developed to help the IAEA detect clandestine nuclear programs. While administration officials have defended the BSA as an effective monitoring tool, congressional committees are expected to press for specific details regarding how covered sites will be defined and how agency costs will be reimbursed.
Commercial Provisions and U.S. Industry Involvement
The agreement features an unprecedented commercial provision designed to partner Saudi Arabia with the U.S. nuclear industry and qualified suppliers for power reactors, fuel, and fuel cycle services. The White House is pitching the arrangement as a way to inject cash into domestic nuclear manufacturing—most likely benefiting Westinghouse’s AP1000 reactor—while boxing out rival suppliers from China and Russia.
Two confidential side-letters were transmitted alongside the formal agreement to detail these commercial linkages. Supporters argue that without this agreement, U.S. adversaries would readily step in to supply the lucrative Saudi market, though neither Beijing nor Russia has historically transferred sensitive enrichment capabilities to regional clients.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is a 123 agreement?
A 123 agreement is a bilateral pact required by Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act that governs peaceful nuclear cooperation between the United States and another nation.
Does the Saudi deal require the Additional Protocol?
No. Instead of the standard Additional Protocol, the agreement relies on a bespoke bilateral safeguards agreement that incorporates provisions similar to aspects of the IAEA monitoring framework.
Can Congress block the agreement?
Stopping the agreement would require a joint resolution from Congress passed with a veto-proof majority during the mandatory review period.
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