The Pentagon’s Recent Speed: Can Faster Acquisition Solve the Wrong Problems?
The Department of War (DoW) is undergoing a radical transformation, shifting from decades-long acquisition cycles to a “speed to delivery” model. This overhaul, driven by leaders with backgrounds in private capital, aims to emulate the agility of Silicon Valley. But a critical question remains: will simply accelerating the process lead to better outcomes, or will it merely result in “making the wrong things go faster?”
From PPBS to Lean: A Seismic Shift
For 60 years, the Department of Defense operated under the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), established in 1962 by Robert McNamara. This system prioritized cost optimization and performance metrics. Last November, the DoW officially dismantled PPBS, signaling a decisive pivot towards speed and adopting Lean Methodology. This change isn’t incremental; it’s a top-to-bottom restructuring of how weapons and services are procured, favoring off-the-shelf solutions and rapid-track processes over custom designs and lengthy Federal Acquisition Regulations.
The Counter-Drone Dilemma: A Familiar Pattern
The current focus on counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) exemplifies the potential pitfalls of this new approach. Experts argue the challenge isn’t primarily technological – there’s a wealth of available technology, from jammers to directed-energy weapons – but a “cycle-time gap.” Adversaries can adapt drone technology with rapid firmware updates costing virtually nothing, whereas the DoW’s acquisition system, even with reforms, takes months to respond.
This echoes the counter-IED fight in Afghanistan between 2010 and 2013. Both threats share key characteristics: cheap, commercially available components; rapid knowledge proliferation; modular adaptation; tactical variation; and a tendency to address symptoms rather than root causes.
The Innovation Targeting Cycle: A Missing Piece
The recent reforms, including the creation of Portfolio Acquisition Executives (PAEs) and the elimination of JCIDS, are necessary but insufficient. While these changes streamline the “develop” and “deploy” phases of innovation, they neglect the crucial “detect,” “define,” “assess,” and “distribute” phases. This creates a faster engine without a steering mechanism.
The solution lies in implementing an “Innovation Targeting Cycle,” modeled after the F3EAD process used by Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). This cycle emphasizes continuous feedback and adaptation, ensuring that resources are directed towards solving the right problems, not just deploying solutions quickly.
Key Components of a Successful Cycle
A functional Innovation Targeting Cycle requires:
- Forward-deployed Problem Discovery Teams: Embedded with operational units to identify and curate problems directly from the field.
- Fusion Cells: To analyze data from the field, industry, and labs to validate problems and assess potential solutions.
- Rapid Operational Assessment: Continuous evaluation of deployed systems to measure effectiveness and identify areas for improvement.
- Lateral Distribution at Operational Speed: Sharing lessons learned and best practices across all relevant units in real-time.
The Risk of Repeating Past Mistakes
The DoW spent over $75 billion on counter-IED measures without ultimately “winning” that fight. The risk now is replicating that failure by focusing on technological solutions without adequately understanding and addressing the underlying systemic problems. As one analysis concluded, drones are simply “IEDs that fly now.”
Frequently Asked Questions
Q: What is the Warfighting Acquisition System?
A: The new system prioritizes speed and timely delivery of solutions relevant to warfighters.
Q: What was PPBS?
A: The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, established in 1962, focused on optimizing cost and performance in defense acquisitions.
Q: What is the Innovation Targeting Cycle?
A: A six-phase process – Detect, Define, Develop, Deploy, Assess, Distribute – designed to ensure continuous feedback and adaptation in innovation.
Q: What role did the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) play?
A: The REF rapidly fielded off-the-shelf solutions to soldiers in Afghanistan, demonstrating the effectiveness of a fast-cycle acquisition process.
Pro Tip: Don’t underestimate the importance of understanding the problem before seeking a solution. Spend time defining the challenge accurately to ensure your efforts are focused on the right areas.
Did you know? The Department of War is now led by individuals with significant experience in private capital, including venture capital and private equity.
What are your thoughts on the Department of War’s new acquisition strategy? Share your insights in the comments below!
