Federal workplace safety inspectors detailed severe monitoring and ventilation failures on Tuesday following a January hydrogen sulfide gas leak at Woodland Pulp in Baileyville, Maine, that caused the preventable deaths of two young employees and exposed ten other workers to toxic fumes.
Federal safety investigators scrutinized operations at the Woodland Pulp mill in Baileyville on Tuesday, releasing an 11-page report that outlines a cascade of missed alarms, absent tracking systems, and bypassed safety standards during the fatal Jan. 27 incident. The update from the U.S. Chemical Safety Board follows a preliminary review of the leak, which exposed workers to high concentrations of toxic gas on the facility’s second floor and resulted in the deaths of 20-year-old University of Maine student Kasie Malcolm and 26-year-old engineer Allen Hornberger.
Woodland Pulp Safety Failures and Missing Monitors in Baileyville
Investigators concluded that the mill lacked stationary hydrogen sulfide gas detectors and failed to equip workers with personal wearable monitors that could have warned them of the invisible gas. According to the board’s findings detailed by federal investigators, a 2018 agreement between Woodland Pulp and workplace safety inspectors had permitted the facility to bypass rigorous federal safety requirements, including hydrogen sulfide monitors, based on the determination that the plant did not store large quantities of hazardous chemicals.
The toxic gas was generated inside an aging 1,000-foot-long acid sewer pipe that collects waste from the wood chip bleaching area. Part of that pipe system had been modified in the 1970s to flow upward. In a bleach plant, brown wood chips are bleached and broken down into pulp using chemicals delivered by rail or truck. Although a scrubber is designed to remove toxic gases, its fan had been shut down during a market-related plant shutdown a few days prior to the incident, allowing gas to back up and escape into the larger Kraft Mill factory.
Chemical Safety Board chairman Steve Owens addressed the preventable nature of the disaster in the Tuesday update. Although our investigation is still ongoing, it already is clear that this terrible tragedy should never have happened,
Owens said. Board member Sylvia Johnson added that the company was aware of the hazards associated with hydrogen sulfide gas
but operated without adequate systems in place to monitor or mitigate the hazards,
according to the federal update.
Gas Levels Exceeded Safety Thresholds During the Jan. 27 Leak
The board’s investigation revealed that the facility was not operating its primary safety system on the day of the leak. Six months prior to the incident, the primary acid injection system suffered damage. Rather than repairing it, the mill utilized a backup system located 1,000 feet upstream, which increased the travel time for chemicals to reach sensors and contributed to the chemical reaction.
Furthermore, investigators found that gas escaped through unresolved structural gaps in the ventilation infrastructure. Federal inspectors documented two 1-inch holes drilled into a vent pipe in 2006 for measurements that were never plugged, alongside a 6-inch by 2-inch gash left unpatched from prior maintenance work.
Malcolm and Hornberger were working approximately 15 to 20 feet from a designated hydrogen sulfide release zone when the gas leaked. Investigators determined that both victims were likely exposed to hydrogen sulfide levels topping 500 parts per million. Exposure to 100 parts per million is classified as immediately dangerous,
while concentrations exceeding 500 parts per million trigger rapid respiratory paralysis and death. Ten other workers were exposed to lesser amounts, suffering burning eyes and throats without requiring hospitalization.
Rescue efforts were hampered by a lack of personnel tracking. Malcolm and Hornberger were not located until three hours after the toxic gas had cleared from the building, according to the safety board’s 11-page report.
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