The Crumbling of Rojava: A Turning Point in Syria’s Post-Assad Landscape
The nearly 14-year Syrian civil war (2011-2024) created opportunities for various actors, including the Islamic State and Kurdish fighters. To combat jihadism while avoiding support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Western countries, led by the United States, supported Kurdish soldiers, enabling them to build a proto-state in northern Syria, Rojava. This autonomous state is now facing dissolution as the new Syrian regime aligns with Turkey, Israel, and the United States, diminishing the rationale for continued support of the Kurdish cause.
A Ceasefire Signals the End of Autonomy
A ceasefire agreement between the Syrian government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) was hailed by the United States as a “historic milestone” in Syria’s path to national reconciliation. However, it effectively seals the fate of Rojava as a self-governing entity in northeast Syria. Negotiations began shortly after Assad’s removal in December 2024, aiming to integrate Rojava’s political and military structures into the central state, but ultimately failed to reach a compromise.
By December 2025, with the integration deadline expired, Damascus imposed its will through force. On January 6th, government troops launched an offensive against Kurdish-majority neighborhoods in Aleppo, an isolated SDF-controlled enclave. The Syrian army also exploited SDF vulnerabilities along the Euphrates River in Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor, triggering Arab defections. This offensive forced the SDF to retreat to Kurdish-majority areas, culminating in a temporary ceasefire. Under the terms of the truce, the SDF will integrate into the Syrian army as three brigades, and Kurdish governing bodies will merge with state institutions. Security forces from the Ministry of Interior have begun entering SDF-held cities like Hasakah and Qamishli.
Rojava’s Rise and the Shifting Sands of Alliances
Rojava’s existence as a semi-autonomous region, a global symbol of women’s emancipation and democratic self-governance, was contingent on exceptional circumstances. The Syrian Democratic Forces, controlling over a quarter of Syrian territory at their peak – including key oil fields – emerged from the chaos of the civil war. Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) gradually took control of Kurdish-majority areas in northern Syria. The SDF solidified as a coalition in 2015, successfully defending Kobane against ISIS, aided by crucial U.S. Air support. This marked the beginning of a decade-long alliance between Washington and Kurdish forces.
Rojava maintained distance from major Syrian opposition factions, which it viewed as dominated by jihadist or nationalist currents. Kurdish officials even engaged in discussions with the Assad regime, without reaching an agreement. Following the Battle of Kobane, the U.S. Increased its support, arming and training the SDF, seen as a reliable local ally against ISIS and a strategic presence in a fragmented Syria.
The Limits of U.S. Support and Turkey’s Role
U.S. Support for the Kurds was always “temporary, tactical, and transactional.” Washington overlooked several Turkish offensives that progressively reduced Rojava’s territory and cohesion. Ankara viewed Rojava as a direct threat to its national security, fearing its political experiment would fuel Kurdish aspirations within Turkey. The fragility of U.S. Commitment became apparent after Assad’s fall, disrupting the geopolitical balance that had, often precariously, benefited the Kurds.
The new, Damascus-based government, quickly endorsed by the United States, altered the landscape. The U.S. Shifted its strategy towards playing actors against each other, a long-standing approach in Syrian diplomacy. Initial talks between the government and the SDF appeared to slightly favor the Kurds, but the recent offensive decisively shifted the balance of power.
Converging Interests: Syria, Turkey, Israel, and the U.S.
In this evolving context, the interests of Israel, Turkey, Syria, and the United States began to converge. These actors held a series of meetings in early 2026, opening a political avenue for al-Sharaa towards the northeast. This convergence centered on issues where Rojava had previously leveraged their divergences. Israel secured a security pact with the new regime, brokered by Washington, reducing its incentive to support the Kurds to pressure Damascus. Turkey signaled a willingness to distance itself from Russia, prompting the U.S. To ease its stance on Turkish interests in Syria. Turkey played a key role in bolstering Damascus’s position and contributing to the shift in the balance of power against the SDF.
Al-Sharaa has long enjoyed Turkish support, which became explicit after the swift offensive against a weakened Assad in late 2024. The decades-long conflict between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is central to understanding the dynamics across the Syrian border. Negotiations between the two parties have been ongoing for over a year, initiated by Turkey, potentially aiming to capitalize on the new Syrian dynamic to force the PKK and SDF – considered an extension of the PKK – to disarm and disband. Erdogan may also seek to rally Kurdish voters and parliamentarians through symbolic recognition to sustain his power.
What Could Have Been Done Differently?
It was clear that the window for autonomy wouldn’t remain open indefinitely, and Rojava lacked the potential to turn into a regional power. Could the SDF have compromised with Assad, fighting within a consolidated Syria, reducing the opportunity for jihadist gains? Or, after Assad’s departure, could they have reached an agreement with the new Damascus leadership without demanding constitutional changes, accepting the status quo of December 2025, thereby removing the pretext for military escalation and the subsequent agreement reached from a weakened position? PKK leaders were aware of Washington’s instrumental approach. Were they proactive enough in cultivating alternative strategic alliances? And why did Rojava apparently lack hegemonic influence over Arab-majority regions?
These questions require critical self-assessment, not to dwell on hypotheticals, but to learn lessons for future challenges.
FAQ
Q: What was the role of the United States in the fall of Rojava?
A: The U.S. Provided support to the SDF during the fight against ISIS, but this support was always conditional and ultimately withdrawn as U.S. Strategic interests shifted after Assad’s removal.
Q: What is Turkey’s position on Rojava?
A: Turkey views Rojava as a threat to its national security due to its links with the PKK and has actively worked to undermine its autonomy.
Q: What is the future of the SDF?
A: The SDF will integrate into the Syrian army as three brigades, effectively ending their status as an independent fighting force.