The campaign, which spanned from August 2024 to February 2026, involved 144 suspected drone sightings across 12 NATO member states and Ireland, aimed at observing military objects, testing air defense systems, and disrupting civil aviation.
How the “Shadow Fleet” Facilitates Drone Operations
The IISS report identifies the use of maritime vessels, specifically those within Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet,” as launch platforms for these unauthorized flights. A primary example cited by the IISS is the vessel Arctica. On January 3, 2025, while navigating near the Danish coast, the ship was linked to a swarm of up to 20 drones that overflew the Kēge port before heading out to sea.
The pattern continued later that year. On September 22, 2025, Copenhagen Airport was forced to suspend operations due to drone sightings. The IISS noted that the Arctica, Boracay, and several other “shadow fleet” vessels were operating in the vicinity at the time. Following these events, the French military boarded the Boracay. Emmanuel Macron subsequently stated that the vessel’s involvement in the drone flights over Denmark could not be ruled out.
The IISS report concludes that the frequency of these sightings cannot be properly explained solely by misidentification, hobbyist activities, or accidental disturbances. The scale and coordination of the 144 recorded incidents point to a deliberate strategic campaign rather than isolated accidents.
Why European Air Defenses Are Struggling
The drone campaign exposed significant gaps in European air defense capabilities. According to the IISS, these unmanned aerial vehicles operated with “considerable impunity” throughout European airspace. The report characterizes the situation as a series of tactical successes for Russia, while allied air defenses suffered a “strategic failure.”
One major hurdle for European governments is the attribution of these incidents. To date, no government has officially and publicly assigned blame to Russia for the drone flights. The IISS suggests this hesitation stems from the tendency of authorities to treat each sighting as an isolated security incident rather than a cohesive, multi-national campaign. This fragmented approach has hindered a unified response.
Future Risks: Testing NATO’s Threshold
Looking ahead, the IISS warns that Europe remains poorly prepared to counter low-cost, high-frequency drone incursions. These operations are specifically designed so that they do not trigger a collective NATO response. By avoiding major kinetic attacks, Russia effectively tests the alliance’s reaction times while creating persistent economic and psychological strain on civil aviation and local populations.
To stay updated on regional security trends, monitor official statements from the ministries of defense in countries like Denmark and France, as these nations have been at the forefront of identifying specific maritime assets used in these operations.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why have European governments not officially blamed Russia?
According to the IISS, governments have largely examined these drone sightings as individual, unrelated events rather than a broader, state-led pattern, which has prevented a formal, unified attribution.
What is the primary goal of these drone flights?
The IISS report indicates the campaign aims to test NATO’s response speed, identify vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure, and inflict economic and psychological damage by disrupting civil air travel.
Are these incidents still occurring?
The IISS data covers incidents through February 2026. The report warns that the potential for further incursions remains high, noting that Europe is not yet sufficiently prepared to resist these drone incursions.
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