During a coordinated air raid drill across 14 cities and counties in northern and central Taiwan, authorities drastically cut internet speeds to simulate a communication blackout amid growing military threats from China, according to government officials and local reports. The exercise, which impacted roughly 70% of the island’s 23 million residents, tested alternative backup networks including long-range radio signals as the self-ruling democracy seeks to protect its vital digital infrastructure.
Taiwan Simulates Internet Blackout During Civil Defence Drills
Streets in Taipei emptied on Thursday as air raid sirens sounded and mobile alerts prompted police officers to usher pedestrians into shelters. While these annual drills are routine, this year’s exercise introduced a novel element by severely disrupting internet speeds to mimic a targeted cyber or physical attack on the island’s communications.
Data-heavy applications ground to a halt during the test. According to Chen Hui-xuan, an 18-year-old resident who attempted to use her phone on the metro, video platforms and social media apps barely functioned. “TikTok wouldn’t open at all. Facebook worked, but it was really slow, and messages on Instagram took around 30 seconds to send,” she said.
Jimmy Chu, a 22-year-old worker, noted that work messages failed to deliver during the disruption. “If the idea is to recreate what it might be like during a war, it’s definitely inconvenient, but I can understand why they’re doing it,” he remarked.
That intentional friction is designed to prepare the public, according to Tzeng Yi-suo, an associate researcher at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research. “It’s a starting point for raising public awareness,” Tzeng stated. “Through repeated exercises, people will gradually understand that this is about experiencing that inconvenience and testing the backup systems we may need.”
Testing Long-Range Radio Signals and Alternative Networks
With conventional networks deliberately throttled, residents turned to decentralized technology to maintain contact. Wang Chen-wen, leader of a local civil defense training group, utilized an open-source platform connected via Bluetooth to a small, flat device hanging from her bag.
Standing on the roof of her 25-storey apartment building to secure a better signal, Wang successfully transmitted text messages using long-range, low-power radio frequencies. Within minutes, test messages such as “Testing from Beitou district, Taipei” reached a peer in a neighboring district.
“You can’t wait until something actually happens to realise you should have prepared,” said Wang, who began learning the platform six months ago. She added that having a basic plan removes panic: “At least I know that if something happens, I already have a basic plan and know what to do, so I won’t face whatever disaster may come with fear or panic.”
Pro Tip: Emergency Communication Readiness
Civil defense advocates recommend exploring open-source, off-grid text messaging protocols that rely on radio frequencies rather than cellular towers to ensure baseline connectivity during sudden utility failures.
Submarine Cable Vulnerabilities and Grey-Zone Tactics
The urgency behind these communication drills stems from severe vulnerabilities in Taiwan’s physical data pathways. The government classifies its submarine cable network—comprising 16 international lines and 10 domestic ones—as an “irreplaceable digital lifeline.”
However, several of these undersea cables have sustained damage in recent incidents involving Chinese or China-linked vessels. Taiwan’s coast guard categorizes these events as a “grey zone” strategy intended to exhaust the island’s resources without triggering open warfare.
Judicial actions have already followed specific incidents. In 2025, a Chinese captain was convicted of deliberately damaging a cable connecting Taiwan’s main island to the offshore Penghu archipelago. A separate captain was later convicted of negligently damaging a cable serving the Matsu archipelago.
Building Multi-Layered Backups Inspired by Ukraine
To prevent a single point of failure from isolating the island, Taipei is pursuing multi-layered backup communications, including low-Earth-orbit satellite networks. This strategy borrows directly from lessons observed in Ukraine, where satellite systems maintained connectivity after Russian forces targeted conventional infrastructure.
Taiwan’s legislature recently approved amendments that could pave the way for Elon Musk’s Starlink to enter the local market. Yet, reliance on Starlink remains controversial among lawmakers due to Musk’s extensive commercial interests in China.
Tzeng warned that hostile forces could exploit the “high degree of uncertainty and fear” that accompanies a major internet outage. “The question is how you use the backup communications channels available to get reliable information to people and reassure them,” Tzeng noted.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why did Taiwan disrupt internet speeds during the recent drills?
Authorities cut internet speeds across 14 cities and counties to simulate a coordinated communication attack and test public readiness for a digital blackout.
What backup communication methods are residents using?
Residents are testing open-source platforms that transmit text messages via long-range, low-power radio signals without relying on cellular networks.
What are the primary threats to Taiwan’s internet infrastructure?
Taiwan’s submarine cable network faces threats from physical damage, with multiple international and domestic cables having been severed in recent years by Chinese or China-linked vessels.
Join the Conversation: How is your local community preparing for emergency infrastructure disruptions? Share your thoughts in the comments below, or subscribe to our newsletter for more updates on global civil resilience.
Worth a look