The 2016 South China Sea Award & Future Code of Conduct

According to researchers Joanne Lin and Huynh Trung Dung, the legal divergence over the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award continues to challenge ASEAN and China as they negotiate a legally binding Code of Conduct (COC). While ASEAN views a binding treaty as essential for establishing predictability and managing maritime tensions, Beijing maintains its rejection of the arbitral ruling as illegal and void, creating a fundamental gap in how both sides interpret the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Negotiation Momentum and the Push for a Legally Binding COC

For more than a decade, key ASEAN Member States have pursued a legally binding COC as the primary benchmark for managing disputes in the South China Sea. Formal negotiations began in 2018, reflecting a regional desire to replace the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). While the DOC established important political norms—such as committing parties to peaceful dispute resolution and self-restraint—its non-binding nature proved insufficient to prevent recurring maritime incidents, according to Lin and Dung.

Momentum for the negotiations accelerated during Indonesia’s 2023 ASEAN Chairmanship, when ASEAN and China agreed to a three-year timeline to conclude the talks. The Philippines subsequently reinforced this timeline by calling for the completion of the COC by the end of 2026. Senior officials from ASEAN and China met in Kuala Lumpur on May 21, 2026, for the 26th ASEAN-China SOM-DOC meeting to review DOC implementation and advance the COC text.

The Legal Shadow of the 2016 Arbitral Award

Ten years after the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award, the legal framework governing the region remains deeply fractured. China has consistently rejected the tribunal’s ruling, arguing that the arbitration violated state consent and UNCLOS principles, and maintaining that territorial and maritime delimitation disputes cannot be resolved through imposed solutions. Conversely, certain claimant states utilize the 2016 Award as a vital legal reference point to advance their maritime claims under UNCLOS.

This persistent disagreement creates a central dilemma for current negotiators: if the parties cannot agree on the interpretation and application of UNCLOS, a future legally binding COC faces severe operational hurdles. Beijing signed UNCLOS in 1982 and generally supported developing countries’ maritime positions, but its current assertion of broad maritime rights—including the nine-dash line and exclusive economic zone entitlements for the Spratly Islands—clashes directly with the 2016 ruling and the legal positions of several ASEAN members.

Institutional Design and Practical Dispute Management

International agreements rely on clear provisions and workable practical arrangements rather than formal binding status alone to achieve effectiveness. Because the COC is not designed to resolve underlying sovereignty or maritime delimitation disputes, Lin and Dung note that its primary value lies in reducing risks and encouraging restraint.

China has historically favored bilateral negotiations and consultations with directly concerned parties, utilizing UNCLOS Article 298 opt-outs to exclude certain disputes from compulsory binding procedures. Given these divergent approaches to dispute settlement, the institutional design of the COC requires robust practical mechanisms for communication, consultation, and implementation to maintain its credibility when legal consensus remains out of reach.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the main objective of the ASEAN-China Code of Conduct?

The COC aims to establish a rules-based framework that promotes predictability, reduces incident risks, and manages maritime tensions in the South China Sea, though it is not intended to resolve underlying sovereignty disputes.

Why is the 2016 Arbitral Award controversial in COC negotiations?

China rejects the 2016 ruling as illegal and void, while several ASEAN claimant states use the award as a key legal reference under UNCLOS, leading to deep divisions over how a future COC should interpret international maritime law.

How does the COC differ from the 2002 DOC?

While the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties relies on non-binding political commitments, ASEAN’s pursuit of a Code of Conduct focuses on creating a legally binding instrument backed by practical implementation mechanisms.