Pakistan has formally accused India of violating international law following the announcement of the Chenab-Beas Link Tunnel Project. Foreign Office Spokesperson Tahir Andrabi stated that India failed to share notice or seek consultations regarding the infrastructure project, characterizing it as a breach of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This development follows India’s 2025 decision to put the IWT in abeyance in response to the Pahalgam terror attacks.
Why the Chenab-Beas Link Project is contentious
The proposed tunnel project represents a significant departure from India’s historical policy of strategic restraint regarding water-sharing. According to Uttam Kumar Sinha, a Senior Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, the project is designed to maximize India’s permissible rights by transferring water from the Chenab system to the Beas basin. While the IWT generally prohibits inter-basin transfers on western rivers, Sinha notes that India is operating under the premise that these restrictions are currently suspended due to the treaty being in abeyance.

Did You Know? The Indus Waters Treaty, signed on September 19, 1960, by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, required India to pay £62 million to finance replacement canals for Pakistan, an act many Indian parliamentarians at the time criticized as excessive generosity.
Shifting diplomatic postures
The current state of water diplomacy marks the culmination of a decade-long hardening of India’s foreign policy. Former High Commissioner of India to Pakistan, Ajay Bisaria, observes that India’s posture has evolved from “No talks with terror” after the 2016 Uri attacks to “No trade with terror” following the 2019 Pulwama attack. The 2025 shift to “No water for terror” indicates that New Delhi now views water-sharing as inextricably linked to national security and sovereignty.
Expert Insight: The transition from a rules-based treaty framework to a policy of “zero-tolerance” suggests that India is attempting to use its status as an upper riparian state as a tangible lever against cross-border violence. By moving toward unilateral infrastructure development, India is effectively challenging the long-standing assumption that water-sharing could remain insulated from broader geopolitical hostilities.
What may happen next
The future of the IWT remains uncertain as both nations move into uncharted territory. Analysts expect that if Pakistan continues to experience tensions over the western rivers, the rhetoric of “water war” may intensify, as evidenced by Pakistan Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir’s August 2025 statement that the Indus is not “Indians’ family property.” While some experts like Amit Ranjan of the Institute of South Asian Studies suggest that an “Indus Waters Treaty 2.0” is necessary to account for climate change and evolving needs, any movement toward renegotiation remains stalled by the fundamental breakdown in bilateral relations.

Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary objection Pakistan has raised?
Pakistan’s Foreign Office claims India has failed to communicate or consult regarding new water projects, which they argue violates the IWT and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Why did India put the IWT in abeyance in 2025?
According to official policy shifts described by Ajay Bisaria, the decision followed the April 2025 Pahalgam terror attacks as a deterrence measure to address the costs of terrorism.
What was the original division of the rivers under the 1960 treaty?
The treaty allocated the three western rivers—the Jhelum, Chenab, and Indus—to Pakistan, while the three eastern rivers—the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej—were assigned to India.
How do you view the balance between national security interests and the necessity of maintaining international water-sharing agreements?
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