The Finish of the “Near-Peer” Era: Navigating US-China Military Parity
For years, strategic discourse in Washington described China as a “near-peer” adversary—a power approaching, but not yet reaching, the capabilities of the United States. Even though, recent assessments from high-ranking military leadership suggest this terminology is now obsolete. The reality is simpler and more sobering: the two superpowers have reached military parity.
Lt. Gen. Stephen Sklenka, the USMC Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics and a former Deputy Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), has challenged the “near-peer” narrative. According to Sklenka, China is now a peer because it rivals the U.S. In nearly every measure of national influence.
Lessons from Operation Epic Fury: The Asymmetric Warning
To understand the risks of a potential conflict with a peer adversary, military strategists are looking closely at the outcomes of Operation Epic Fury. While this operation targeted a middle power—Iran—the results provided a wake-up call for the U.S. Military apparatus.
During Operation Epic Fury, the U.S. Maintained control of the skies and most of the seas. Despite this dominance, Iran was still able to inflict significant losses on American forces and their allies. The conflict saw hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles launched at bases across the region, including those in Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and Jordan.
Beyond the kinetic battlefield, the operation highlighted the fragility of global trade, specifically through the ongoing economic pressure caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. If a middle power could create such substantial disruption, the potential for a conflict with a peer adversary like China is exponentially more dangerous.
From Administrative Hubs to Combat Formations
One of the most critical takeaways from recent combat operations is the vulnerability of traditional military bases. For too long, these installations were viewed as “administrative garrison shelters”—safe havens for logistics and personnel.
Lt. Gen. Sklenka argues that this mindset must change immediately. Bases must now be treated as combat formations, holding the same strategic importance as a division, wing, or Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). In a high-intensity conflict, these bases are not just support hubs; they are primary targets that must be hardened and defended as active combat zones.
The Strategic Vision: Supplanting Global Leadership
The drive toward military parity is not accidental; It’s the result of a calculated long-term vision. Insights into the thinking of President Xi Jinping suggest a clear objective: to upend the existing international structure and supplant the United States as the global leader.
This vision transforms the nature of modern warfare in the Pacific. It is no longer about regional skirmishes or containment, but about a fundamental struggle for global hegemony. For U.S. Forces, In other words adapting to a “peer adversary” environment—a scenario that is fundamentally new to the American military experience in the modern era.
Future Trends in Indo-Pacific Security
As the U.S. Adjusts to this new reality, several key trends are likely to define the next decade of Pacific security:
- Hardening of Infrastructure: A massive shift toward protecting bases from long-range missile and drone strikes.
- Logistical Resilience: Moving away from centralized hubs toward distributed, agile logistics to avoid single points of failure.
- Asymmetric Integration: Incorporating lessons from the Iran conflict to defend against “low-cost, high-impact” weaponry like swarm drones.
- Enhanced Ally Coordination: Deepening the integration of combat-capable forces within partner nations to present a credible deterrent.
Frequently Asked Questions
What does “military parity” mean in this context?
It means that China now rivals the United States in nearly every measure of national influence and military capability, moving beyond the status of a “near-peer” to a true equal.
What was the primary lesson from Operation Epic Fury?
The operation proved that even a middle power can inflict significant damage on a superior force using drones and missiles, highlighting the need to treat military bases as active combat formations rather than administrative centers.
Why is the Pacific theater different from previous conflicts?
Unlike previous decades where the U.S. Operated with uncontested dominance, the Pacific now involves a peer adversary with the vision and capability to challenge the U.S. As the global leader.
Join the Conversation
Do you believe the U.S. Is doing enough to adapt its infrastructure for a peer-level conflict? Should bases be redesigned as combat formations?
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