Beyond New START: Navigating the New Nuclear Landscape with Russia and China

The world is entering a new era of nuclear strategy, one where the old rules no longer apply. With the New START treaty nearing expiration, it’s time to confront the complex reality of a multipolar nuclear world. This article explores why simply extending or replacing New START is insufficient and what the U.S. must do to adapt.

The End of an Era: Why New START Is Outdated

New START, signed in 2010, was designed for a different geopolitical reality. It focused on limiting deployed strategic nuclear warheads, capping both the U.S. and Russia at 1,550. While it provided a degree of stability at the time, the world has fundamentally shifted.

Consider this: Russia, under Vladimir Putin, has aggressively modernized its nuclear forces, including developing novel systems designed to circumvent the treaty’s limitations. More alarming is the deployment of approximately 2,000 short- and medium-range, lower-yield nuclear weapons not covered by New START. These regional nuclear forces undermine decades of arms control efforts.

And what about China? Its “strategic breakout,” as described by former U.S. Strategic Command chief Admiral Charles Richard, is nothing short of breathtaking. China is rapidly modernizing its nuclear arsenal and is on track to becoming a full-fledged nuclear peer to both the U.S. and Russia.

The Two-Front Threat: Deterrence in a Multipolar World

New START’s constraints on U.S. strategic forces now undermine its ability to deter both Russia and China simultaneously. The treaty’s failure to address shorter-range nuclear weapons further exacerbates the problem, as these are the weapons most likely to be used in a regional conflict. In essence, New START is a relic of the past that no longer serves U.S. security interests.

The 2023 Strategic Posture Commission highlighted the dangers of the evolving partnership between Russia and China, noting the potential for “opportunistic aggression” and “cooperative two-theater aggression.”

Treaty Traps: The Perils of Arms Control with Aggressors

Throughout history, arms control agreements have proven effective only when all parties share a genuine commitment to peace. When aggressive intentions are present, treaties are often violated covertly, overtly, or lead to an arms race in unregulated areas.

A prime example: the naval treaties of the 1920s and 1930s, which limited capital ships but not submarines, leading to intense competition in submarine development. Nazi Germany eventually abandoned all pretense of adhering to the limits.

Russia, in particular, has a history of violating arms control agreements. According to the State Department’s most recent arms control compliance report, Russia is violating the Biological Weapons Convention and has vetoed a UN resolution reaffirming the Outer Space Treaty. Furthermore, reckless actions by the Russian military routinely disregard the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement and the Reagan-era Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities Agreement, increasing the risk of accidental escalation.

Did you know? Russia has violated at least nine separate arms control agreements since Putin came to power. This track record raises serious doubts about the prospects of any meaningful arms control deal with Moscow.

China’s Reluctance: Arms Control as a Sign of Weakness

Negotiating arms control with China presents similar challenges. Beijing views any willingness to engage in arms control as a sign of weakness. Transparency and verification processes are seen as intrusive and akin to espionage. The Chinese Foreign Ministry dismissed the Trump administration’s proposal for arms control talks as “neither serious nor sincere.”

China is unlikely to consider arms control until it achieves nuclear parity with the U.S. and Russia, a goal that the Department of Defense estimates is still a decade away, according to the 2023 China Military Power Report.

Strategic Adjustments: Rebuilding U.S. Deterrence

With the expiration of New START, the U.S. must prepare for force posture adjustments. The initial step should involve reversing changes made to comply with the treaty.

For example, almost 100 launch tubes for Trident II missiles on Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines have been deactivated since 2011. Approximately 30 B-52 bombers have also been stripped of their nuclear capabilities. Reversing these actions would quickly bolster U.S. deterrence capabilities.

Additionally, the U.S. should increase the number of warheads carried on existing Trident II submarine-launched missiles and land-based Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Pro Tip: Enhancing U.S. deterrence isn’t just about numbers. It’s about signaling resolve and demonstrating the capability to respond effectively to any threat.

Modernization and Expansion: Adapting to the New Reality

The U.S. Strategic Modernization Program, initiated by the Obama administration, should be expanded to address the evolving nuclear landscape. While a massive buildup isn’t necessary, a modest increase in deployed warheads is essential to maintain credible deterrence against both Russia and China.

Increasing the number of new Columbia-class strategic nuclear submarines from a minimum of 12 to at least 15 and the number of new B-21 bombers from 100 to at least 150 would significantly enhance U.S. strategic capabilities.

Beyond Intercontinental: Addressing Regional Nuclear Threats

Since the 1970s, U.S.-Soviet/Russian nuclear arms agreements have primarily focused on intercontinental-range systems, excluding regional nuclear forces. This approach was based on the assumption that any nuclear conflict would rapidly escalate to intercontinental weapons. However, this assumption is no longer valid.

Strategists now generally agree that the first use of nuclear weapons is more likely to occur in an escalating regional conventional conflict. Putin has made such escalatory threats against Ukraine and NATO, and Russia’s approximately 2,000 regional nuclear weapons are not subject to New START’s limits. Therefore, any new arms control effort must encompass regional nuclear threats in Europe and the Asia-Pacific.

The Council on Foreign Relations’ Global Conflict Tracker offers up-to-date analysis on potential regional hotspots where nuclear escalation is a concern.

A New Treaty Framework: Comprehensive Limits and Flexibility

Any future nuclear treaty should establish an overall limit for all deployed nuclear weapons, both regional and intercontinental. Under this ceiling, each party should have the flexibility to adjust the mix of intercontinental and regional weapons, provided they notify the other party.

This flexibility would strengthen U.S. military forces and enhance the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees. While this approach might lead to a higher overall number of nuclear weapons, it would more accurately reflect the reality of existing arsenals and the diverse range of threats.

Verification Challenges: Overcoming Obstacles to Progress

Verifying the number of regional nuclear weapons deployed by each side will be a significant challenge. However, this problem can be overcome once both sides acknowledge their mutual interest in establishing limits. Without this foundational goodwill, any treaty pursuit would be futile.

FAQ: Navigating the New Nuclear Landscape

• What is the New START Treaty? It’s the last remaining nuclear arms control agreement between the U.S. and Russia, limiting deployed strategic nuclear warheads.
• Why is New START expiring? The treaty is set to expire in early 2026, and there’s no agreement to extend or replace it.
• What are the main concerns with Russia’s nuclear arsenal? Russia has modernized its forces, developed novel systems, and deployed regional nuclear weapons not covered by New START.
• How is China’s nuclear posture changing? China is undergoing a “strategic breakout,” rapidly modernizing its nuclear arsenal and aiming to become a nuclear peer to the U.S. and Russia.
• What should the U.S. do after New START expires? The U.S. should reverse changes made to comply with the treaty, modernize its nuclear forces, and develop a strategy to deter both Russia and China.

Reader Question: What are your thoughts on the role of emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, in the future of nuclear arms control?

In the absence of meaningful arms control agreements, the U.S. must maximize the deterrent potential of its current arsenal. Clinging to outdated agreements based on Cold War assumptions would leave the U.S. struggling to address the challenges posed by two nuclear peers increasingly aligned against its interests.

What are your thoughts on the future of nuclear arms control? Share your comments below and explore other articles on our site to delve deeper into this critical issue. Subscribe to our newsletter for regular insights on global security and strategic affairs.