China‘s Maritime Militia: Absent but Not Negligible in the Taiwan Straits
While China’s maritime militia, also known as civilian maritime gang on the global stage, is not playing a lead role in Beijing‘s multi-domain pressure campaign against Taiwan, its presence in the strategic theater is far from negligible. A recent article in The Diplomat shed light on this vessels, known for their ambiguous and often aggressive behavior in other disputed waters, are seemingly underutilized in the Taiwan Strait.
Historically, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has relied heavily on the various branches of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), particularly the Navy and Air Force, to mount pressure in the strait. However, in August 2022, following the visit of then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan, China dispatched a 6,600-ton coastguard cutter to the strait as part of a broader operational response. Since then, Chinese coastguard vessels have maintained a constant presence in the waters around Taiwan and its peripheral islands, aiming to undermine Taipei‘s sovereignty and threaten its security. These movements have been categorized as "gray zone" operations — a term that echoes China’s behavior in the South China Sea. Notably, unlike the situation in the South China Sea, Chinese maritime militia appears to play a minimal role in the Taiwan Strait.
The Paradox of China’s Maritime Militia
In the South China Sea, the maritime militia serves as a key instrument of Chinese policy, masquerading as civilian fishing vessels. These forces fulfill multiple roles, from asserting China’s presence in disputed waters to physically blocking foreign vessels. Intriguingly, in the Taiwan Strait, the role of these units seems to be diminished, yet not entirely absent.
The question remains: Why isn’t China employing its maritime militia in this region in the same way it does in the South China Sea? Is it a matter of force availability, or are different strategic calculations at play?
Fujian: A Maritime Militia Stronghold
One hypothesis suggests that China may lack experienced militia units in the Taiwan Strait theater. However, the province of Fujian, directly across from Taiwan, boasts a robust fishing industry and a well-organized maritime militia network that combines civil and military resources. These units are prepared to operate in the strait’s waters and, with their advanced organizing capabilities, resemble their counterparts in the South China Sea.
For instance, in Lianjiang, near the strategically crucial Matsu Islands, local authorities have prioritized building maritime militia forces as part of their military-civil integration plans. These forces, supported by local civil and military structures, are equipped for complex missions, including patrols and operations in sensitive waters.
Different Theaters, Different Strategies
The absence of a prominent maritime militia role in the Taiwan Strait can be explained by operational differences between this theater and the South China Sea. In the narrow strait, the coastguard can cover most presence and coercion needs due to its proximity to the Chinese mainland. Moreover, the maritime militia’s ambiguous status and lack of visible armaments may not effectively serve China’s specific objectives against Taiwan, such as projecting power and authority.
Future Prospects
Although China’s maritime militia is not a driving force in the campaign against Taiwan, it would be unwise to underestimate its strategic potential. In escalatory scenarios, these forces could be mobilized for more intense operations, like blocking Taiwan’s maritime traffic or instigating incidents that could serve as pretexts for more aggressive military actions.
China’s deployment of its maritime militia in the Taiwan Strait will depend on operational needs and political objectives, but one thing is certain: these units are ready and available for deployment when required.
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