China’s Foreign Ministry has formally adopted the term “war criminals shrine” in its diplomatic vocabulary to describe the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, marking a calculated political shift from factual references of wartime figures to institutional condemnation, according to research fellow Chen Yang of the Chinese think-tank Charhar Institute.
Diplomatic Language Shift Over Yasukuni Shrine
Whenever a question was asked about Japanese leaders visiting or making offerings to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, China’s Foreign Ministry would refer to it by its name, describe it as a place that houses World War II war criminals and mete out its criticism. That routine changed on Aug 17, when ministry spokesperson Lin Jian dropped the traditional name entirely during a regular press briefing. According to Chen, the new terminology—translated as “zhan fan shen she”—signals both domestically and internationally that Beijing rejects any attempt to portray the site as an ordinary religious facility or a memorial for those killed in war.
The term “war criminals shrine” first surfaced during a regular media briefing of the Foreign Ministry in Beijing on April 21, after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi made an offering to the shrine on the first day of a traditional spring festival. At the time, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that Yasukuni was “in effect” a war criminals shrine. By August, the qualifier was dropped completely in response to Takaichi sending another offering on Aug 15, which marked in Japan as the 81st anniversary of the end of World War II. The Yasukuni Shrine commemorates Japan’s 2.5 million war dead but among them are 14 World War II criminals, making any visit or offerings to the shrine by the country’s leaders anathema to China and South Korea.
Did you know? The Yasukuni Shrine commemorates Japan’s 2.5 million war dead but among them are 14 World War II criminals, making any visit or offerings to the shrine by the country’s leaders anathema to China and South Korea, which suffered under Japanese occupation.
Regional Security Tensions and Militarism Warnings
The latest shift in language comes as Beijing and Tokyo are facing a broader deterioration in ties, shaped by tensions over Taiwan, Japan’s defence modernisation and the two sides’ competition for influence in South-east Asia. Professor Heng Yee Kuang of the University of Tokyo’s Graduate School of Public Policy told ST that China’s new language “seems broadly consistent with its recent warnings about ‘neo-fascism’ and ‘new militarism’ in Japan”. Heng noted that while the Japanese media uses similar “war criminal” language to describe those convicted at the Tokyo Trials, which took place from May 1946 to November 1948, applying it to the shrine as a whole risks tarnishing the remaining nearly 2.5 million war dead enshrined at Yasukuni from Japan’s wars over the past 150 years. Still, Charhar’s Chen emphasized that the stronger label “does not represent a broader shift or escalation in China’s overall diplomatic approach towards Japan”, and its core logic is more likely to be the drawing of historical red lines, rather than the closing of the door to dialogue.
Strategic Messaging Across South-east Asia
For Beijing, the historical memory may also be a regional instrument, as it competes with Japan for strategic influence among its Asian neighhours. Henrick Tsjeng, associate research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University, said China has sought to appeal to South-east Asians through “common historical memories” of Japanese imperialism. By invoking shared memories of victimhood under Japanese imperialism in World War II, Beijing has been attempting to impress upon South-east Asians its view that Tokyo is reviving its militaristic past, and that South-east Asia should, therefore, join China in censuring and isolating Japan. Despite these diplomatic efforts, Tsjeng observed that apart from Myanmar, “it has not made much impact on the positions of South-east Asian governments regarding ties with Japan”, largely due to the goodwill that Japan has fostered in the region for decades, and also in part due to the preference of South-east Asian countries not to choose sides. Data from the ASEAN Studies Centre at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute confirms this dynamic, with Japan consistently voted as the most trusted partner in South-east Asia, retaining the top spot in 2026’s poll.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the Yasukuni Shrine?
The Yasukuni Shrine commemorates Japan’s 2.5 million war dead but among them are 14 World War II criminals, making any visit or offerings to the shrine by the country’s leaders anathema to China and South Korea, which suffered under Japanese occupation.
Why did China change its terminology for the shrine?
According to research fellow Chen Yang, the linguistic shift marks a shift by China from factually citing the presence of 14 convicted Class-A war criminals enshrined in Yasukuni as deities, to applying a political judgment to the shrine itself as an institution to deny Japanese conservative politicians room to present the site simply as a religious facility or a memorial for the war dead.
How do South-east Asian countries view Japan?
Japan is consistently voted as the most trusted partner in South-east Asia, according to an annual survey by the ASEAN Studies Centre at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, though apart from Myanmar, China’s campaign has not made much impact on the positions of South-east Asian governments regarding ties with Japan due to regional goodwill and a preference not to choose sides.
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