Baltic Sea Fiber Optic Cable: Latvia Ups Security Measures Amid Recent Attacks
In the Baltic Sea depths, there are no electric power cable loops, but rather a fiber optic internet cable managed by the Latvian National Radio and Television Center (LVRTC), stretching from the port of Ventspils to Sweden. Both LVRTC and the Armed Forces have recently bolstered their vigilance to ensure the cable’s security.
"LVRTC experts monitor underwater cable operations 24/7 using technology that allows real-time detection of changes to promptly identify potential risks," explained LVRTC Board Chairman Girts Ozols. "We also have redundancy routes to redirect data flow and prevent service disruptions for our clients."
The issue of undersea cable security was discussed at a meeting of the National Security Council. The Latvian Naval Forces have strengthened monitoring of Latvia’s communication infrastructure and maintain real-time information exchange with allies about the security situation in the Baltic Sea.
Latvian Naval Forces Commander Admiral Māris Polencs noted that currently, a naval vessel is constantly present in the Baltic Sea, cooperating with coastal defense and colleagues from Baltic Sea states. The most likely saboteur method is dragging an anchor across the seabed. If a suspicious ship appears near the cable, the Naval Forces make it clear that the situation is being watched.
"Our vessels carry out investigations based on suspicions and send our on-duty vessel to react," stated Admiral Polencs. "So far, everything is under control. The presence of our patrol vessel also serves as a preventive mechanism to deter potential offenders from attempting sabotage."
Context:
Recently, there have been multiple incidents of underwater infrastructure damage in the Baltic Sea. On December 25, the "EstLink 2" electric cable connecting Estonia and Finland was sabotaged. Suspicions have been raised about a Russian "tanker" ship’s involvement in the cable’s damage.
Security analysts believe that NATO countries’ critical infrastructure object sabotage is in Russia’s interests as part of Moscow’s hybrid war against the West. In November, two underwater communication cables were cut in the Baltic Sea, one connecting Sweden and Lithuania, and another connecting Estonia and Finland. Both cables have since been repaired. A Chinese cargo ship, the "Yi Peng 3," is suspected of being involved in these cable damages.
In 2023, the Balticconnector gas pipeline connecting Estonia and Finland was sabotaged. Investigation later found that a Hong Kong-registered container ship, "NewNew Polar Bear," was responsible for the damage. In the same month, the electricity cable between Estonia and Finland was also cut, with Sweden reporting separate damages to its cable connecting it to Estonia at around the same time.
In 2022, the Nord Stream gas pipelines connecting Russia and Germany were explosively damaged in the Baltic Sea.
With increasing security threats in the Baltic Sea, Latvia and other Baltic countries are taking proactive measures to protect their underwater communication infrastructure, ensuring smooth and secure data transmission.
