A leaked intelligence report from a European Union member state reveals a state of heightened alarm within the Kremlin, characterized by intense paranoia regarding internal conspiracies and the physical safety of Vladimir Putin.
Security Overhaul and Presidential Isolation
Since the start of March 2026, the Kremlin has been gripped by fears of sensitive information leaks and the potential for a coup. Reports indicate that the Russian president specifically fears assassination attempts involving drones carried out by members of the political elite.
In response, the Federal Protective Service (FSO) has implemented drastic security measures. Visitors to the presidential administration now undergo two levels of screening, including full searches by FSO personnel.
The president’s movements have been severely restricted. Neither Vladimir Putin nor his family visit their usual residences in Valdai or the Moscow region. Instead, the president frequently utilizes modernized bunkers, specifically in the Krasnodar region, where he may work for weeks at a time.
To maintain a public appearance of normalcy, Russian media outlets continue to use pre-recorded video materials. Notably, there have been no visits to military infrastructure this year, marking a shift from the frequent trips conducted in 2025.
Additional measures include periodic communication network outages in certain districts of Moscow and the deployment of K9 units and personnel along the Moscow River to counter drone attacks.
Personnel working closely with the president are now banned from using mobile phones, required to use devices without internet access, and forbidden from using public transport. FSO transport is mandatory, and surveillance systems have been installed in the homes of the president’s photographers, guards, and cooks.
Political Instability and the Role of Sergei Shoigu
Sergei Shoigu, the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation since May 2024, is identified as a potential factor for destabilization. Despite his influence in military command, he is now associated with the risk of a state coup.
This instability was exacerbated on March 5, 2026, by the arrest of Ruslan Tsalikov, Shoigu’s former first deputy. The move is viewed as a breach of informal security guarantees for the elite, which may weaken Shoigu’s position and increase the likelihood of his own criminal prosecution.
Inter-Agency Conflict and Military Protection
Tensions between Russia’s security services have spiked following the December 22, 2025, killing of Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov in Moscow. A second attack occurred at the same location on December 24, 2025.
During a narrow meeting on December 25, 2025, Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov accused intelligence services of failing to predict these attacks, which he claimed caused fear and disorganization within the Russian Armed Forces.
FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov countered by blaming the Ministry of Defense for lacking a dedicated special unit for the physical protection of high-ranking leaders. Simultaneously, Rosgvardia Director Viktor Zolotov stated that his resources could not be diverted to protect Ministry of Defense officers.
As a result of this friction, Vladimir Putin and FSO Director Dmitry Kochnev expanded the FSO’s protection mandate. While such protection previously only applied to Valery Gerasimov, it has now been extended to ten high-ranking generals.
The expanded protection list includes:
- Colonel General Nikolai Bogdanovsky (First Deputy Chief of the General Staff)
- Colonel General Sergei Istrakov (Deputy Chief of the General Staff)
- Colonel General Alexei Kim (Deputy Chief of the General Staff)
- Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy (Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff)
- Colonel General Viktor Poznikhir (First Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff)
- Lieutenant General Stanislav Gadjimagomedov (Chief of the National Defense Management Center)
- Admiral Igor Kostyukov (Chief of the GRU)
- Colonel General Vladimir Zarudnitsky (Chief of the General Staff Military Academy)
- Colonel General Alexander Chayko
- Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev
Verified Indicators of Paranoia
Independent reports corroborate several claims in the intelligence document. A former FSB employee confirmed that the FSO, rather than the FSB, is responsible for the large-scale internet outages in Moscow.
a current FSB officer reported that it has grow significantly harder to obtain authorization for wiretapping in non-political criminal cases. This represents because surveillance equipment has been redirected to monitor the government and other state authorities.
Potential Future Developments
The current environment suggests several possible trajectories. The continued erosion of informal guarantees for the elite could lead to further arrests within the security apparatus, potentially accelerating the isolation of figures like Sergei Shoigu.
the reliance on pre-recorded media and bunker isolation may further detach the presidency from the operational realities of the military, while the ongoing rivalry between the FSB and the General Staff could lead to further shifts in the FSO’s protection mandates.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why is the Kremlin concerned about drones?
The Russian president fears that representatives of the Russian political elite could use drones to carry out an assassination attempt.
Who is now under the protection of the FSO?
In addition to Valery Gerasimov, ten high-ranking generals—including three deputies of the Chief of the General Staff and the chief of the GRU—have been added to the list of persons under enhanced FSO protection.
What restrictions are placed on staff working near the president?
Staff are prohibited from using mobile phones and public transport. They must use devices without internet access, travel exclusively via FSO transport, and are subject to surveillance in their homes.
Do you believe that increased isolation and surveillance of the inner circle strengthen or weaken a leader’s grip on power?
