The Tisza Party has officially submitted its first proposal for constitutional amendments, aiming to fundamentally restructure the executive branch and the management of public assets in Hungary. The proposal, introduced by party representatives Melléthei-Barna Márton and Justice and Constitutional Committee chair Hantosi István, targets prime ministerial term limits, the legal basis of the Sovereignty Protection Office, and the oversight of public interest asset management foundations.
Proposed Limits on Executive Power
A central component of the amendment is the introduction of a maximum tenure for the Prime Minister. Under the new proposal, no individual could serve as Prime Minister for more than two terms, totaling a maximum of eight years.
Crucially, the amendment includes a retroactive clause. It states that the eight-year limit must account for any prime ministerial mandates held since May 2, 1990, including any periods of interruption. This measure would prevent Viktor Orbán, who has led the country through five cycles since 1998, from returning to the office.
“Nem választható meg miniszterelnöknek az, aki összesen – megszakításokkal együtt – már legalább nyolc évig miniszterelnöki megbízatást töltött be. E nyolcéves időtartam számításakor az 1990. Május 2. Vagy anután betöltött miniszterelnöki megbízatást kell figyelembe venni.”
Restructuring Foundation Oversight and National Assets
The Tisza Party also seeks to dismantle the constitutional basis for the Sovereignty Protection Office, which was established in 2023. By removing this constitutional provision, the party aims to pave the way for the subsequent dissolution of the office itself.
the proposal addresses “public interest asset management foundations” (KEKVA), which currently manage the operations of 21 domestic universities and the Mathias Corvinus Collegium (MCC). The amendment would declare that the assets held by these foundations are national property.
Under the proposed changes, the government would exercise the founder rights of these foundations and would possess the authority to dissolve them. In the event of a dissolution, the Hungarian state would serve as the universal successor to the foundation’s assets.
Implications for European Union Funding
The reform of the KEKVA model is closely tied to Hungary’s ability to access European Union funds. The current management structure has been identified as a major obstacle to meeting the conditions required for financial support.
The government is currently facing 27 preconditions that must be met by the end of August to submit claims for the 10.4 billion euro recovery fund and to avoid the repayment of a 1 billion euro advance. Currently, approximately 2 billion euro has been lost, 4.2 billion euro remains frozen in cohesion funds, and an additional 2 billion euro is blocked due to risks surrounding scientific freedom.
The lack of transparency and potential conflicts of interest have already resulted in institutions under these foundations being restricted from participating in Erasmus+ educational exchanges and Horizon Europe research collaborations.
What Happens Next?
The Hungarian Parliament is scheduled to convene next week, at which time these legislative proposals may be brought forward for discussion. Because constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority in Parliament, the success of the proposal depends on securing significant legislative support.
If the amendments are adopted, they are slated to take effect the day immediately following their proclamation. Péter Magyar has indicated that these changes are part of a broader, multi-year constitutional process that may eventually be reinforced by a national referendum.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the proposed limit on the Prime Minister’s term?
The proposal limits the Prime Minister to a maximum of two terms, or a total of eight years of service.
How would the new term limits affect previous leaders?
The amendment would apply retroactively, counting all prime ministerial service held since May 2, 1990.
What happens to the assets of a dissolved foundation under this proposal?
If the government dissolves a public interest asset management foundation, the Hungarian state would become the universal successor to its assets.
How might these structural changes reshape the future of Hungarian governance?
