The Lebanese Army has intensified its deployment and missions in the city of Nabatieh following Israeli threats to expand the battle at the “Ali El Taher” hill and fears of the escalation extending to the city of Nabatieh, according to regional reports. The military move arrived after appeals and calls from Nabatieh and beyond, drawing local, municipal, and religious backing without receiving formal opposition from Hezbollah.
Historical Shift in Southern Lebanon Deployment
The evolving role of the military in southern Lebanon marks a stark contrast to events over three decades ago. In 1993, following the “Accountability” operation launched by Israel against Lebanon, particularly the south, a decision was made to deploy the Lebanese Army in the south. At that time, Prime Minister Rafik Hariri headed the government under President Elias Hrawi, and General Émile Lahoud was the Army Commander. Lahoud rejected the implementation of the decision, and Syrian intervention blocked its execution under the title that the army’s deployment could turn into protection for Israel or a confrontation with the resistance.
More than three decades later, the paradox appears striking. The Syrian military presence in Lebanon has ended, the Syrian regime itself has fallen, and Hezbollah has lost the strategic depth that Syria provided it for decades, revealing its authentic roots linked to the Iranian regime. Crucially, the discussion regarding the army in the south has begun to change from within the environment historically presented as the “environment of the resistance.”
Establishing Experimental Zones and Stable Communities
The state has initiated the implementation of the concept of “experimental zones,” but the beginning was in areas highly complex security-wise and politically, where the transition from the reality of weapons to full state authority faces real field difficulties. The stumbling of the experiment does not justify stopping it, but rather calls for continuing and supporting it. There is a parallel track that can be launched immediately in areas where the state does not need to wrest its authority, because their people have already settled their choice in favor of legitimacy.
In the south, there are villages and towns whose people remained in their land despite the aggression and the dangers of war. They refused displacement and evacuating the land for the Israeli enemy, and at the same time refused to turn their villages into arenas for armed activity outside the state. That is, they combined two positions that political discourse long tried to portray as contradictory: clinging to the land and refusing Israeli attacks on the one hand, and rejecting war and weapons outside the state on the other. After the experiences of “Gaza support” and “Iran support” and the immense prices resulting from them, these cases become more important.
Did You Know? In 1993, after Operation “Accountability” launched by Israel on Lebanon, a decision was made to deploy the Lebanese Army in the south. Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was head of the government under President Elias Hrawi, and General Émile Lahoud was the Army Commander. Lahoud refused to implement the decision, and Syrian intervention blocked its execution.
Focusing on Marjeyoun, Hasbaya, and Arqoub
Marjeyoun, Hasbaya, and Arqoub can be a first model for this track. From Shebaa, Kfar Shouba, Rachaya Al Foukhar, Al Hebariyeh, Kfar Hamam, Fardis, El Mari, and Hasbaya, reaching Marjeyoun and other towns and villages, there are local communities that stayed on their land, clung to the state, and rejected war and armed activity outside legitimacy. Here, the state does not need to wait for a security settlement in order to begin. The environment is ready, and what is required is for the state to meet its citizens.
Initial steps focus on security through enhancing the deployment of the army, its patrols, and its clear presence, then activating ministries, departments, and public institutions, repairing war damage, rehabilitating roads and infrastructure, enhancing health centers, and supporting official schools and their funds, some of which have become unable to secure the requirements for continuation. Alongside that, it is necessary to launch programs to support livelihoods, farmers, artisans, and small institutions, because stabilizing the population in border areas is not only a security issue; it is also an issue of work, education, health, and services.
When border communities see that rejecting unauthorized armed factions brings functional schools, repaired infrastructure, and sustainable livelihoods, the state transitions from a theoretical concept into a tangible daily anchor.
International Support and Gradual State Authority
The same logic applies to the international community, which has linked its support for Lebanon to progress in restricting weapons to the state. Is it conceivable to wait for the handling of the very last piece of weapons outside legitimacy across all Lebanese territory before beginning support? It is more appropriate for the process to be gradual; every region where state authority advances and manifestations of weapons outside legitimacy recede is met by progress in support, reconstruction, and development.
Without concurrent economic support, border communities face poverty, isolation, and institutional vacuums that can easily be filled again with weapons, service networks, and clientelism. Ensuring that communities choosing state institutions are rewarded with robust local development proves that the path of legality is viable.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why did the Lebanese Army increase its deployment in Nabatieh?
The deployment intensified following Israeli threats to expand the battle at the “Ali El Taher” hill and fears of the escalation extending to the city of Nabatieh, coming after appeals and calls from Nabatieh and beyond.
What distinguishes the current southern deployment from the 1993 attempt?
In 1993, Army Commander General Émile Lahoud refused to implement the decision to deploy the army in the south, and Syrian intervention blocked it under the title that the army’s deployment could turn into protection for Israel or a confrontation with the resistance. Today, the Syrian military presence and regime have ended, and the army’s presence has become a factor to reassure residents and limit Israeli pretexts, with no official announced objection from Hezbollah.
Which regions are identified as primary models for immediate state expansion?
Marjeyoun, Hasbaya, and Arqoub—including Shebaa, Kfar Shouba, Rachaya Al Foukhar, Al Hebariyeh, Kfar Hamam, Fardis, El Mari, and Hasbaya—are identified as a first model for this track where local communities remained on their land and rejected war and armed activity outside legitimacy.
How does the presence of the army change the dynamic regarding Israeli actions?
The presence of the army has become a factor to reassure the population and limit Israeli pretexts, rather than “protection for Israel” as was said in previous stages, shifting the equation so that the state’s presence is no longer the opposite of protecting the land, but rather a condition for it.
How should international assistance be delivered according to local proposals?
Assistance should be delivered progressively, where every region in which state authority advances and weapons outside legitimacy recede is met by progress in support, reconstruction, and development, rather than waiting to address the very last piece of weapons across all Lebanese territory.
What are readers asking about the future of state authority in southern border towns?
Worth a look