Drawing on decades of public service and international postings from Karachi to Darfur, the analysis examines how nations and leaders repeatedly rely on armed actors, militias, and proxies for short-term gains, only to see those same tools become severe national liabilities.
In 1983, following a family relocation to Karachi during his father’s posting to Tehran, the neighborhood initially appeared ordinary, with evenings dedicated to cricket, football, and hockey among cheerful, ambitious boys. Within a few years, however, cricket bats gave way to TT pistols during the violence of the 1980s and 1990s. According to the account, young boys joined ethnic armed groups, fighting rivals and eventually each other, resulting in numerous deaths, disappearances, and an academic year lost to strikes and curfews.
Did You Know? During the 1980s and 1990s in Karachi, ordinary neighborhood streets shifted as young boys traded cricket bats for TT pistols, eventually joining ethnic armed groups that fought first rivals and then each other.
Global and Regional Parallels in Proxy Conflict
The pattern extended beyond Pakistan. At university, the Afghan jihad drew young men across the border under the belief that they were defending faith and fellow Muslims, leading to student casualties from which not all returned. Later in Balochistan, tribal rivalries, sectarian violence, and insurgency fed on old grievances as disputes acquired new weapons and groups were accommodated or confronted interchangeably. In Darfur, while serving with the United Nations, Dr. Imam observed Arab Muslims and African Muslims fighting brutally as identity and power divided them, culminating in the Janjaweed and mass displacement while UN peacekeepers arrived too late for many.
Powerful states have similarly relied on private military structures and armed actors to advance strategic interests at reduced political costs. Private military contractors like Blackwater sparked controversy in Iraq, while Russia leaned heavily on the Wagner Group across multiple theaters before Wagner ultimately challenged Moscow. Domestically, Pakistan has faced its own variations, including the growth of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) amid militancy and state confrontation, Baloch separatist violence intersecting with wider regional contests, and religious street mobilization demonstrating how quickly organized anger and backed force acquire political power.
Expert Insight: Dr. Imam’s analysis emphasizes that short-term political expediency—whether sought by external powers, governments, or communities—consistently ignores the reality that politics lacks a remote control for violence once it is unleashed. Proxies cultivated against one enemy or raised to defend a specific community frequently evolve into independent threats and instruments of fear.
Institutional Strength Versus Delusion
Decisions regarding proxy deployment and armed intervention are frequently made in distant capitals, conference rooms, and intelligence briefings where proxies appear cheaper than war and coercion faster than politics. On the ground, however, ordinary people inherit the consequences while planners move on. Dr. Imam notes that once violence is legitimized as a political instrument, it develops its own constituencies, economies, and narratives, eventually consuming the very cause that initially justified it.
Confronting terrorism, sectarianism, ethnic violence, and polarization requires recognizing that institutions take decades to build while hatred can be mobilized in days. Analysts expect that nations continuing to rely on shortcuts, expediency, and proxies will find themselves grappling with consequences that outlive the original strategies. The fundamental choice facing society remains centered on whether to build institutions capable of managing conflict or to continue living in the delusion that violence can permanently do the job instead.
Frequently Asked Questions
In 1983, after moving to Karachi for education, the author witnessed ordinary neighborhood streets transition within a few years as cricket bats gave way to TT pistols and local boys joined ethnic armed groups.
What international peacekeeping mission is specifically mentioned in the account?
Dr. Imam observed conflict during service with the United Nations in Darfur, where Arab Muslims and African Muslims fought brutally and the Janjaweed became associated with destroyed villages and mass displacement.
Which private military contractors and groups are cited as examples of state instruments becoming liabilities?
The text cites Blackwater, which became controversial in Iraq, and the Wagner Group, which Russia relied on across several theaters before Wagner challenged Moscow.
? What institutional safeguards or choices does Dr. Imam argue are necessary to address growing polarization and violence instead of relying on proxies?
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