Southeast Asia faces a crunch moment in marathon negotiations with China to finalize a code of conduct in the South China Sea, with the upcoming November 10 East Asia Summit in Manila serving as a key target date. The ongoing diplomatic push tests whether Beijing is genuinely willing to calm regional disputes or is instead pursuing a tactical strategy to solidify territorial control while talks proceed.
Officials target Manila summit for final text
ASEAN and Chinese officials have held monthly sessions throughout the year to meet the foreign ministers’ directive for a final text by the end of 2026. The primary focal point is the November 10 annual East Asia Summit in Manila, where regional leaders will host Chinese President Xi Jinping. The proposed code aims to establish rules of behavior and reduce confrontations where rival territorial claims overlap. China asserts historic rights over nearly 90 percent of the South China Sea, conflicting with overlapping claims by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia.
The diplomatic push runs parallel to persistent maritime tensions. The deadliest historical clash occurred in 1988, when a clash in the Spratly Islands killed 64 Vietnamese sailors. Current encounters typically involve boat ramming, water cannons, batons, flares, lasers, and sonar bursts. Chinese fishing militias frequently swarm contested features, prompting Vietnam to develop its own fishing militia to counter these moves.
Philippine official criticizes Beijing negotiating strategy
Skepticism over a binding agreement remains high among claimant states. Philippine Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro delivered sharp criticisms during a May speech, arguing that China uses negotiations as a means of gaining advantage rather than resolving conflicts. Teodoro stated that Beijing urges the Philippines to return to talks instead of meeting legal obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), effectively executing a talk-and-take strategy.
Satellite imagery documents extensive dredging and island-building, with China establishing 20 outposts in the Paracel Islands and seven in the Spratlys, alongside a continuous coast guard presence at Scarborough Shoal. Meanwhile, Vietnam has constructed military facilities on 21 features in the Spratlys, including docks and a runway. Formal code of conduct negotiations began in 2018, designed to prevent, manage, and settle disputes while stating that the draft does not affect rights under UNCLOS. However, Beijing rejects the treaty’s binding dispute resolution mechanisms and demands that the code ban ASEAN from holding joint military exercises with outside powers like the United States.
Chinese and foreign ministers debate regional stability
During July talks with ASEAN, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi insisted that the South China Sea issue should not obstruct bilateral relations. He accused elements within the Philippine military and police forces of making deliberate provocations that serve external forces. Conversely, Wang offered to work with ASEAN to remove disruptions and accelerate consultations on the code.
At the same regional meeting, Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong raised concerns regarding aggression and destabilising conduct in the waterway, urging compliance with international law and safe maritime behavior. Malaysia estimated at the start of the year that 70 percent of the code of conduct’s content is already agreed upon. Veteran analyst Professor Carlyle Thayer of the University of New South Wales noted that negotiations remain fraught over geographic scope, legal status, self-restraint, and the role of outside powers.
Maritime Reality Check: While Malaysia estimates that 70 percent of the code of conduct text is agreed upon, key disputes over geographic scope, legal status, and third-party military exercises remain unresolved as the target deadline approaches.
Common Questions About The South China Sea Negotiations
What is the main goal of the proposed code of conduct?
The proposed code aims to set rules of behavior, lessen confrontations in areas where territorial claims overlap, and provide a framework for the prevention, management, and settlement of disputes in the South China Sea.
Why does China’s position on UNCLOS create friction with other claimant states?
China claims historic rights over nearly 90 percent of the South China Sea and rejects the binding dispute mechanisms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, contradicting an UNCLOS court ruling that dismissed Beijing’s historic claims a decade ago.
What specific security demands is Beijing making regarding external powers?
China wants the code of conduct to ban ASEAN member states from holding joint military exercises with countries from outside the region, a provision aimed at limiting the operational presence of the United States and its allies.
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